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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Uruguay Round ended successfully on December 15,
1993 after negotiators from many countries overcame numerous
differences in positions. All 117 participants in the trade
talks agreed on a text of some 500 pages containing 40
separate agreements, even though in the final countdown the
deal lost some of its promised features, including
agreements on maritime services, film, television and
aircraft subsidies, financial services and abuse of anti-
dumping laws, (i)
It is well known that disagreement on agricultural
issues was one of the main reasons it took so long for the
Uruguay Round to be finalized. The deadlock on agricultural
policy threatened to jeopardize all the other components of
the larger trade reform effort, but the impasse was finally
overcome. At first glance, the importance of the
agricultural negotiations appears surprising. Agriculture
was handled by only one of the fifteen separate negotiating
groups in the Round. Agricultural trade makes up only
about 10 percent of the total world trade, and farming
represents less than 4 percent of the gross domestic product
(1) " And now for something completely different," The
Economist December 18, 1993: 59.
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in almost all major industrial countries. On further
investigation, however, this result is less surprising.
Trade negotiators had to reconcile the demands of powerful
and well-established domestic groups with the often
conflicting larger international interests of the state.
So, negotiators could not decide on agricultural issues on
their own, but had to pay attention to the opinions of the
related domestic lobby groups. It has also been said that
some participating governments put agricultural issues onto
the agenda of the Uruguay Round as a way to solve domestic
problems arising in relation to agriculture. This means
that there was a strong connection between international
negotiations and domestic politics.
It was mostly the French government supported by its
farm lobbyist groups that thwarted the efforts of compromise
on agricultural issues between the US and the EC. Failure
to achieve compromises on agriculture would have meant the
breakdown of the whole Uruguay Round trade negotiations.
Again, at first glance, this is somewhat surprising because
France was not the most powerful country in the world,
especially in economic terms. Its trade comprised just 6.4
% of the total world trade. (2) The reason why the influence
of the French farm lobby groups was so conspicuous can also
(2) United Nations, 1991 International Trade Statistics
Yearbook (New York: UN Publishing Division, 1993) S1-S4.
2
be found in the willingness of the other negotiating
parties, the Cairns Group and the US, to strike a deal on
agricultural trade reform. The Cairns Group, composed of 14
agriculture exporting countries, needed a fair trade regime
in agriculture because they could not afford to compete with
the EC and the US in export subsidies. The US also wanted
to cut its support programs to its farmers to reduce budget
pressure
.
There was another reason why other participating
countries could not ignore the intransigence of the French
government. The whole Uruguay Round was expected to fail if
there was no reform agreement on agricultural trade. Unlike
the situation in previous Rounds, agricultural issues in the
Uruguay Round was a matter of importance not only to the US
and the EC but also to the Cairns Group. So, France could
benefit from this changed environment in agricultural trade
talks
.
France also took advantage of the EC decision making
process. Because of the fear of possible National Assembly
election losses, the French government opposed the EC's
agricultural reform accord with the US which could reduce
support programs to its farmers. This opposition was
possible because of the fact that each member of the EC
could use veto power on matters where a vital national
interest is at stake. The French government often
threatened to use it to get concessions from the US as well
3
as other members of the EC in the farm reform negotiations.
France had therefore successfully rejected any compromise
reached between the US and the EC up until December 1993.
The linkages between international negotiations and
domestic politics meant that some lobby groups could
successfully interfere with the negotiations in the Uruguay
Round. Robert Putnam's two-level games model offers a way
to understand such situations
. (3) According to him, at the
international level (Level I)
,
bargaining takes place among
representatives of states in order to forge an agreement.
Level II bargaining involves attempts to gain ratification
of the agreement by those domestic constituencies whose
concurrence is needed to implement the agreement. Quite
often, what may be in the interests of the state at Level I
collides head-on with interests of entrenched domestic
interests at Level II. But, the two levels are highly
interactive. Level II interests usually mold the bargaining
positions and strategies of negotiators at Level I.
Expectations about prospects for ratification also determine
the parameters within which potential agreements are
considered. Conversely, Level I developments can affect
politics at Level II, sometimes increasing prospects for
(3) Summary from Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games," Double -Edged
Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics,
Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam, eds
.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 431-468.
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ratification and at other times diminishing them. But, it
IS also true that failure to gain acceptance of the
agreement at Level II can doom the agreement altogether.
This is because the agreement cannot be amended at Level II
without reopening the negotiations at Level I. Negotiators
thus must always be aware of the constraints imposed on them
in Level I deliberations by Level II constituencies.
Yet Level II constraints can work to the advantage of
negotiators at Level I. Putnam's model allows analysts to
understand why certain countries gain negotiating advantage
through a comparison of participating countries' win-sets. A
win-set for a given Level II constituency is defined as the
set of all possible Level I agreements that would win - that
is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents -
when simply voted up or down. Wider win- sets enhance the
prospects for ratification because the win-sets of each side
are more likely to overlap. Ratification is impossible if
no overlap exists. However, negotiators with narrow win-
sets may garner some bargaining leverage with their
counterparts because negotiators whose win-sets are
perceived to be large will be pressed to make concessions.
The negotiator with the narrower win- set has an advantage in
negotiations as long as the others regard its acceptance as
essential to an agreement.
I will therefore try to figure out why and how the
Uruguay Round agricultural trade negotiations were
5
deadlocked by applying the two- level game analysis to the US
and the EC. Though others were involved in this complex
process, the US and the EC were the main negotiating
partners. On both sides, several government agencies and
domestic groups were actively involved in the decision-
making. To analyze the dynamics in Level I, I will examine
the positions and intentions of negotiators in the
international fora: in the US, top decision makers and trade
representatives (USTR) and in the EC the Directorate General
for Agriculture who has the authority to negotiate for the
Commission on agriculture. Explaining French leverage over
the negotiations, however, requires supplementing Putnam's
analysis by taking account of how France could put a lock on
EC decisions. France alone was a middling participant while
France steering the EC was a major partner, one of the triad
of US- Japan-EC. In effect, France and the other EC members
had to have a Level I game of their own before and while
they were in a Level I game with the US, Japan, the Cairns
group, and all the others in the Uruguay Round. Within the
EC, policy is made through a multitiered, compartmentalized
and consensus driven process that favors agriculture. Among
other things, trade policy decisions have to be made in the
European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Powerful
national farm lobbies exert influences on the
representatives in those agencies in this process. So I
will examine the decision making process in the European
Commission and the Council of Ministers. It is also
necessary to look into the changes in the EC's Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) because in most cases, the
positions of the EC in the agricultural negotiations were
determined based on the changes of the CAP.
In relation to Level II, I will consider the positions
of the groups of constituents who can be affected by or
affect the agreements on agriculture. In the US, they are
domestic farm lobby groups, such as American Farm Bureau
Federation and American Soybean Association, and Congress.
With regard to France, I will explore how important
agriculture is in the French economy and political process.
Political factors such as elections, may also have helped
the French farmers to be able to maintain their strong
influence on the decision-making process.
The study is organized as follows. In the second
chapter, I will explore what two-level game is and how it
works. In chapter three, I will look into the agricultural
policy process including farm support programs in the US,
France and the EC, the history of the agricultural trade
negotiations and the issues of agriculture in the Uruguay
Round as a background for the following chapters. In
chapter four, I will examine why and how the Uruguay Round
was deadlocked, and how the agricultural issues became an
obstacle to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round
trade talks. In the first section of this chapter, I will
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look into the initial proposals and responses and explain
the differences in proposals. In the second section, I will
examine the negotiating process to the modified proposals,
responses to those proposals and explain why the deadlock
continued. In the third section, I will examine why there
were continuous confrontations. In chapter five, I will
explain the process of overcoming the differences and the
adoption of the final text. Well into this stage also,
differences of the positions of the US and the EC on many
parts of the agricultural issues remained unchanged.
However, the incentives of the EC to agree with the US to
cut subsidies shifted as CAP spending spun out of control
around the time when the Dunkel draft was presented. This
situation encouraged a narrowing of differences between the
US and the EC. In the first section of this chapter, I will
therefore look at the negotiating process to the proposal of
Mr. Dunkel, Director General of the GATT, and the responses
to the proposal. In the second section, I will analyze how
the oilseeds dispute influenced the Uruguay Round trade
talks. In the third section, I will look at how the US and
the EC could reach an agreement on agriculture at Blair
House but why it was rejected by France. In the fourth
section, I will probe into the final process to the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
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CHAPTER II J
EXPLANATION OF TWO
-LEVEL GAMES
Robert Putnam begins his explanation of two- level games
by saying that domestic politics and international relations
are often entangled. It is, however, unclear whether
domestic politics really determine international relations,
or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly
"Both, sometimes." The more interesting questions are
"When?" and "How?" (i) Putnam says that his two-level games
can answer these questions.
He says that the politics of many international
negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game.
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their
interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable
policies, and politicians seek power by constructing
coalitions among those groups. At the international level,
individual governments seek to maximize their own ability to
satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse
consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two
games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as
their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign. (2)
(1) Putnam 431.
(2) Putnam 436 .
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Each national political leader appears at both game
tables. Across the international table sit his foreign
counterparts, and at his elbows sit diplomats and other
foreign policy advisors. Around the domestic table behind
him sit party and parliamentary figures, spokesmen for
domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups,
and the leader's own political advisors. The unusual
complexity of this two-level game is that moves that are
rational for a player at one board may be impolitic for that
same player at the other board. (3)
The political complexities for the players in this two-
level game are staggering. Any key player at the
international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may
upset the game board; and conversely, any leader who fails
to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks
being evicted from his seat. On occasion, however, clever
players will spot a move on one board that will trigger
realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve
otherwise unattainable objectives
.
(4)
Putnam analyzes, in detail, how his two- level game
works. He explains the importance of win- sets, determinants
of win- sets, bargaining tactics under uncertainty and
restructuring of game tactics and reverberation.
(3) Putnam 436-437.
(4) Putnam 43 7
.
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A. The Importance of Win- Sets
Negotiators representing two states meet to reach an
agreement, subject to the constraint that any tentative
agreement must be ratified by their respective states. For
the moment, Putnam presumes that each side is represented by
a single leader or chief negotiator who has no individual
policy preferences, but rather tries to come to an agreement
that will be attractive to his constituents.
Putnam decomposes the process into two aspects:
Level I - bargaining between the negotiators, leading
to a tentative agreement.
Level II - separate discussions within each state
about whether to ratify the agreement
.
(5)
In this decomposition, expectational effects are quite
important. There will probably be prior consultations and
bargaining at Level II to work out an initial position for
the Level I negotiations. In contrast, the need for Level
II ratification is certain to affect the Level I bargaining.
In fact, expectations of rejection at Level II may
jeopardize negotiations at Level I without any formal action
at Level II. In many cases, the two-level process may be
iterative, as the negotiators try out possible agreements
and probe their constituents' views. In more complicated
(5) Putnam 43 8
.
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negotiations, the constituents' views may even be formed
during the negotiations. However, the requirement that any
agreement made at Level I agreement must eventually be
ratified at Level II creates an important link between the
two levels
.
(e)
Ratification may entail a formal voting procedure at
Level II, such as the constitutionally required two-thirds
vote of the US Senate for ratifying treaties, but here the
term covers any decision process at Level II that is
required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement,
whether formally or informally. The actors at Level II may
represent bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social
classes, or even public opinion. (7)
The only formal constraint on the ratification process
is that an identical agreement must be ratified by both
sides. This means that a preliminary agreement made at Level
I can be modified to gain greater Level II support only by
returning to the Level I negotiations and securing the other
side's consent to the modification. In the end, then,
ratification must be simply voted up or down. (s)
Given this set of arrangements, Putnam defines the
"win-set" for a given Level II constituency as the set of
(6) Putnam 43 8.
(7) Putnam 438-439.
(8) Putnam 43 9.
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all possible Level I agreements that would "win"- that is
gain the necessary majority among the constituents- when
simply voted up or down. For two quite different reasons,
the contours of the Level II win-sets are very important for
understanding Level I agreements
.
(9)
First, larger win- sets make Level I agreement more
likely, ceteris paribus. By definition, any successful
agreement must fall within the Level II win-sets of each of
the parties to the accord. Thus, agreement is possible only
if those win- sets overlap; and the larger each win- set, the
more likely they are to overlap. Conversely, the smaller
the win-sets, the greater the risk that the negotiations
will break down.
The second reason why win- set size is important is that
the relative size of each Level II win-set will influence
the distribution of the joint gains from the international
bargain. The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator,
the more he is at a disadvantage in Level I negotiations.
In comparison, a small domestic win-set can be a bargaining
advantage at Level I
.
(9) Putnam 439-442
.
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B. Determinants of the Win-S^t
Three sets of factors are important in affecting win-
set size, (lo) First, the size of the win-set depends on the
distribution of power, preferences and possible coalitions
among Level II constituents. It is possible to say that the
lower the cost of no-agreement to constituents, the smaller
the win-set. Some constituents may face low costs from no-
agreement, and others high costs, and the forroer will be
more skeptical of Level I agreements than the latter. In
some cases, evaluation of no- agreement may be the only
significant disagreement among the Level II constituents,
because their interests are relatively homogeneous. The
distinctive nature of such homogeneous issues stands out
more by contrasting them to cases in which constituents'
preferences are more heterogeneous, so that any Level I
agreement bears unevenly on them. Thus, an internationally
coordinated relation may face domestic opposition from those
who think it goes too far and from those who think it does
not go far enough. So, the task of a negotiator grappling
with a heterogeneous conflict is more complicated.
The participation rate of the constituents also
influences the size of a country's win-set. For example,
when the costs and/or benefits of a proposed agreement are
(10) Putnam 443-452 .
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relatively concentrated, it is reasonable to expect that
those constituents whose interests are most affected will
exert special influence on the ratification process.
The composition of the active Level II constituency
also varies with the politicization of the issue.
Politicization often activates groups who are less worried
about the costs of no-agreement, thus reducing the effective
win- set
.
We also have to consider that various groups at Level
II are likely to have quite different preferences on the
several issues involved in a multi- issue negotiation. In
general, the group with the most at stake in a particular
issue is also likely to hold the most extreme position on
that issue. This means that the chief negotiator is faced
with tradeoffs across different issues.
Second, the size of the win-set depends on the Level II
political institutions. Ratification procedures definitely
influence the size of the win-set. For example, the win-set
will most likely be smaller if a two-thirds vote is required
for ratification than if only a simple majority is required.
Domestic political practices too can affect the size of
the win-set. Strong discipline within the governing party,
for example, increases the win- set by widening the range of
agreements for which the Level I negotiator can expect to
receive backing. State strength and state autonomy is
relevant too. The more the main negotiators are independent
15
of their Level II constituents, the larger their win-set and
consequently the greater the probability of achieving
international agreement. However, the less pressures a
state receives domestically, the weaker its relative
bargaining position internationally.
Third, the size of the win- set depends on the
strategies of the Level I negotiators. Each Level I
negotiator has an explicit interest in making the most of
opponent's win- set, but regarding his own win- set, his
motives are mixed. The larger his win- set, the more easily
he can reach an agreement, but, also the weaker his
bargaining position against his opponent. This fact often
poses a tactical dilemma. For example, one effective way to
show commitment to a given position when bargaining at Level
I is to gather support from one's constituents. On the
other hand, such tactics may affect the attitudes of the
constituent irreversibly, hindering subsequent ratification
of a compromise. Conversely, preliminary consultations at
home, aimed at preparing one's constituents for a
ratification compromise, can undercut a negotiator's ability
to project an implacable image internationally.
Nevertheless, a negotiator who wishes to expand his win- set
in order to encourage ratification of an agreement, may
exploit both conventional side-payments and generic good
will. In a two-level game, the side-payments may come from
unrelated domestic sources or they may be received as part
16
of the international negotiation. In addition to the use of
specific side-payments, a chief negotiator whose political
standing at home is high can more easily win ratification of
his foreign initiatives
,
C. Uncertainty and Bargainincr Tactics
Level I negotiators are often ignorant about Level II
politics, particularly on the opposing side. Uncertainty
about the size of a win-set can be both a bargaining device
and at the same time a stumbling block in two- level
negotiation . (ii) In Level I bargaining, negotiators have an
incentive to understate their own win-sets. Since each
negotiator is likely to know more about his own Level II
table than his opponent sees, the claim has some
plausibility. On the other hand, uncertainty about the
opponent's win-set increases one's concern about the risk of
involuntary defection. (12) Deals can only be struck if each
negotiator is convinced that the proposed deal lies within
his opposite number's win-set, and thus will be ratified.
Thus, a utility-maximizing negotiator must seek to convince
his opponent that his own win- set is kinky; in other words,
(11) Putnam 452-454,
(12) Involuntary defection means the behavior of an agent
who is unable to deliver on a promise because of failed
ratification.
17
that the proposed deal is sure to be ratified, but that one
more favorable to the opponent will probably not be
ratified
.
D. Restructurincr and Reverberation
In the process of negotiations, it may be necessary to
restructure the game and to alter one another's perceptions
of the costs of no-agreement and the benefits of proposed
agreements because not only the real costs and benefits of
the agreement but also the perception of the constituents t
them can change over time. (13) In some instances, perhaps
even unintentionally, international pressures reverberate
within domestic politics, tipping the domestic balance and
thus influencing the international negotiations. This can
be something to facilitate agreement as well as create a
domestic backlash.
(13) Putnam 454-456
.
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CHAPTER III
BACKGROUND OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Although the influence of the lobby groups of the US
was different from that of the EC including France because
of the different agricultural decision making processes,
their demands were same: continuation of the agricultural
support programs. So, these governments could not reduce
their support programs to help their farmers get more market
shares in international competitions. The programs were
price or income support to prevent farm incomes from falling
too far below others' and export subsidies and import
barriers to boost exports of farro products and limit imports
from abroad. All of these programs became the object of
criticisms by the other GATT member governments in the
1980s. By then the farm support programs also put budgetary
pressure on the US and the EC. This situation encouraged
the decision makers from the US and the EC to find a way out
of it and they found that the Uruguay Round trade talks
could solve the problem.
19
A. Domestic Politics of Agriculture
in the US and the EC
1. US's Decision Making Bodies and Process
In the US, both the executive and the legislative
branches play significant roles in making agricultural
policies. The constitution's separation and balance of
power requires that the two work together. (i)
a. Decision-Making Process
Within the executive branch, the US Department of
Agriculture (USDA) plays a leading role in the development
of farm policy and the Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service (ASCS) exercises a strong influence
within USDA. ASCS is the focal point for lobbying efforts
by commodity groups because it is responsible for
administering commodity programs. ASCS and commodity groups
have maintained close ties out of organizational self-
interest, with commodity groups providing information and
support for USDA programs in return for the protection of
their interests. ASCS has a politically powerful
(1) H. Wayne Moyer and Timothy E. Josling, Agricultural
Policy Reform: Politics and Proce s s in the EC and the USA
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990) 127-131.
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bureaucracy with a network of state and county offices, each
with an elected committee of influential commercial farmers.
These committees are influential in administrative and
policy decisions. ASCS has the ability to mobilize a
formidable grass-roots army of farmers and commodity groups
to protect its interests against the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Office of Management and Budget { 0MB) and
Congress. Thus, an obstacle to commodity policy reform
exists inside USDA.
There is no fixed structure for dealing with domestic
agricultural policy in the White House. The 0MB and the
Council of Economic Advisors are related to agricultural
decision making. The 0MB is responsible for keeping all
federal spending within budgetary guidelines and serves as a
significant force for agricultural reform. The Council's
principal responsibility is for macro-economic policy even
though it also analyses and participates in any area of
policy with significant economic impact. In recent years,
the Council appears to have had little impact on
agricultural policy decisions. Only one staff member is
assigned to agriculture in the Council of Economic Advisors.
However, in relation to the negotiations in the Uruguay
Round, the trade representative (USTR) played a very
important role. The USTR is the US government's principal
trade policy agency, a cabinet level agency headed by the US
Trade Representative who reports directly to the president.
The USTR and five deputies hold ambassadorial rank. In the
USTR, one Assistant Trade Representative is in charge of
agriculture and is aided by a deputy along with a staff of
advisors and staff economists. The Office of the USTR is
the focal point for a number of trade advisory committees
from outside government as well as for administrative
activities within the Executive Branch. The USTR leads
bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. The Office
receives advice and complaints from businesses, individuals,
and members of Congress regarding matters of trade. The
Executive Branch draws heavily on expertise from outside
the government through several advisory groups. The
Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee directly counsels the
government on trade issues of agriculture. In 1994, the two
executive Secretaries of this Committee were from the
Department of Agriculture and from the US trade
representative while its members included representatives
from the American Soybean Association, American Meat
Institute, Archer Daniels Midland Co., National Corn Groups
Association and National Bank for Cooperatives . (2) The
Agricultural Technical Advisory Committee worked mainly
through 10 commodity committees. Committee members were
chosen for technical expertise to advise government
(2) For details on the members of the Committee, see
Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC) , The Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Npant iations : Report of the APAC
(Washington: APAC, 1994) 12-14.
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officials mostly on technical and administrative matters
regarding agricultural trade. (3)
In Congress, the House and Senate Agriculture
Committees, the House commodities sub- committees and the
agriculture sub- committees of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees are important. All of these are
constituency committees with a vast majority of the members
representing districts or states where agriculture is
important. Moreover, in the House commodity sub- committees
,
the members overwhelmingly represent the districts in which
the included commodities are produced.
The largest and best known of the old- line farm groups
is the American Farm Bureau Federation, which claims nearly
two million farm families as members. Another mainstay in
the farm organizations is the National Farmers Union (NFU)
,
which claims nearly a million farm families as members and
was one of the first advocates of the family farmer. The
American Agricultural Movement (AAM) was born out of the
"tractorcade" demonstrations in Washington and other cities
in 1978-1979, when discontented farmers protested against
President Carter's farm policy. In addition, individual
commodity organizations - for soybean, cotton, pork, cattle,
and even honey and sunflower produces - also exert influence
on the decision making process. (4)
(3) Luther Tweeten, Agricultural Trade: Principles and
Policies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) 251-253.
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Agri-business also has interests in the farm decision
making process. The farm and farm-related employment
involves a diverse group of industries, ranging from farm
operations to grocery stores that sell farm products. These
farm and farm-related industries provided over 23 million
jobs, or 17.3 percent of US employment, in 1989.(5) They
also represent 17.9 percent of gross national production.
They are extremely influential, but seldom exercises their
full potential because of their close ties with government
officials. They also have every incentive to maintain low
visibility because visibility invites other groups to
mobilize in response. (e)
b . Farm Support Programs
For more than fifty years, the broad objective of farm
programs has been to absorb the risk farmers incur from
wildly fluctuating prices for commodities which trade in the
most volatile markets in the world. Since World War II, US
farm policy has centered on price stabilization and crop
(4) David Rapp, How the US Got into Agri culture and Why It
Can't Get Out (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc.,
1988) 63-66.
(5) T. Alexander Majchrowicz, Jacqueline L. Salsgiver, US
Farm and Farm-Related Employment in 1989 (Washington: USDA
Economic Research Service, 1993) 1.
(6) Moyer and Josling 134.
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insurance schemes designed to help farmers cope with ever-
changing physical and economic climates. These programs
deal mainly with corn, wheat, cotton, and rice, which
together with soybeans occupy three of every four
commercially planted acres of land in the US. Farm price-
support programs are based on this simple premise: the
entire farm sector of the country can be managed if these
crops can be managed. Over the years, a two- tier system has
evolved to fulfil the federal government's unflagging
commitment to buy farmers' products at a floor price if they
cannot sell them for at least that much on the open market.
At harvest time, the Agriculture Department offers low-
interest loans to farmers who agree to hold all or part of
their crops off the market for as long as nine months. The
goal is to spread sales over the course of a full marketing
year and prevent a glut during the brief period of time when
most farmers bring their crops in from the fields.
Congress sets the rate for this price- support loan. It
is done on a bushel basis, requiring the Agriculture
Department to offer a farmer, say, $2 a bushel for corn,
with the farmer putting up the crop at harvest time, and if
at the end of the nine-month term the farmer-borrower has
not been able to get a market price that is better than the
loan rate, the famer can forfeit the entire crop to the
government and keep the principal. Other than taking over
the crop, the government has no other recourse to get its
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money back. Farmers come under no penalty for nonpayment of
the loan. They do not suffer any stigma either; nothing
like a bad credit rating attaches to a farmer who defaults
on a price-support loan. These are nonrecourse loans. In
effect, the government buys the crop at $2 a bushel,
guaranteeing the farmer who participates in the program at
least that much when signing up at the beginning of the
year. A key feature of these price and income support
programs, as far as the government is concerned, is the
ability to control production from year to year. In years
of expected surpluses, the government periodically makes
farmers reduce their planted acreage as a prerequisite for
getting direct government supports. (7)
Several US laws affected imports of farm commodities
too. Quotas were used to restrict meat imports in 1976.
The Meat Import Act of 1979 was used to restrict meat
imports. The US has also often been at the forefront in
obtaining special trade exemptions for agriculture under the
GATT. A notable example was the breaching of the
prohibition against import quotas. Provisions introduced to
the US to protect domestic price support programs were
Sections 22 and 32. Established under 1935 amendments to
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Section 22 allows
for import quotas and Section 32 for export subsidies.
(7) Rapp 34-37.
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Export subsidies were used extensively in the 1960s,
terminated in 1972, and revived again in 1985. The Export
Enhancement Program (EEP) originated in 1985 to stop the
loss of US international wheat and flour market share to
heavily subsidized EC exports. Another export assistance
program is the Market Promotion Program (MPP) which was
created by the 1990 farm bill and replaced the Targeted
Export Assistance program authorized by the 1985 farm bill.
The 1990 farm bill authorized $200 million for MPP for each
of the years from 1991 through 1995. Differences between
the MPP and EEP are: EEP is limited to commodity exports
suffering injury from unfair practices of competitors,
whereas MPP is not so limited although priority is given to
countering unfair trading practices; EEP is an export
subsidy that tends to reduce world export prices, whereas
MPP is primarily for export product promotion designed to
expand world markets without lowering price. (e) The US
government also used production quotas mainly for milk,
peanuts, and tobacco. This is government -organized
franchises granting a farmer the right to sell a specified
quantity of a crop at a guaranteed price. (s)
Due to the farm support competition with the EC, the US
government found itself spending almost $2 6 billion a year
to support the income of US farmers. These domestic
(8) Tweeten 254-259.
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commodity programs were, however, justifiably criticized,
not only for the burden they placed on taxpayers but also
for the distortions they tended to impose on the production
of farm commodities, and by extension on international
agricultural trade. The combination of the US support
program as well as that of the EC generated high- cost
surplus farm production. This could be sustained only
through tight restrictions on imports or had to be dumped
onto world markets through the use of export subsidies.
These import restrictions and export subsidies, in turn,
tended to generate endless international trade
frictions . (lo)
A number of studies have shown that the US government's
farm support programs have not met all of their objectives.
One study of the EEP showed the increase in wheat exports
resulting from EEP was less than the volume the government
had expected. In addition, far from being budget neutral,
EEP increased budgetary expenses and harmed other exporters
more than the EC. (ii) Another study also concludes that
abolishing the support programs will increase exports and
lower world prices of the crops. (12)
(9) Rapp 157.
(10) D. Vogt, Addressing Unfair Trade: Agricultural Cases
Unde r Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Washington:
Congressional Research Service, 1989) 12-13.
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2. France's Decision Making Rodies and Procpss
In France the President usually plays the most
important role in the decision making process. The
influence of the legislative branch can not be ignored
because of its power to modify bills. However, the prime
minister supported by the majority in the National Assembly
becomes a focal point when a President from one party faces
legislative majority drawn from another, the case of
"cohabitation". The EC also exerts an influence on the
French agricultural decision making process.
a. Decision Making Process
The president is the most important decision-maker and
stands as an arbiter above the other governing institutions.
The president also appoints the prime minister, who
thereupon supposedly selects the rest of the cabinet. (13)
(11) Giovanni Anania, Mary Bohman and Colin A. Carter,
"United States Export Subsidies in Wheat: Strategic Trade
Policy or Expensive Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Tactic?," American
Journal of Agricultural Economics Vol.74 No. 3 (August 1992)
543-544
.
(12) Eric O'N. Fisher, Harry de Gorter, "The International
Effects of US Farm Subsidies," American Journal of
Agricultural Economics Vol.74 No. 2 (May 1992) 266-267.
(13) Vincent E. Mchale, "France," Politics in Western
Europe . Gerald A. Dor fman and Peter J. Duignan eds
.
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988) 55-56.
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The composition of the cabinet is endorsed by the Assembly,
which is most often controlled by politicians more or less
in the same ideological camp as the president. Under
President Mitterrand, a Socialist, the situation has been
more complicated. For five years following the 1981
National Assembly elections produced a Socialist-controlled
Assembly, the composition of governments reflected the
president's wishes to a large extent. However, after the
legislative elections of 1986, when the conservatives
recaptured control of the Assembly, the president was forced
to appoint a prime minister and cabinet to the Assembly's
liking rather than his own. The "cohabitation" of
a Socialist President with a conservative government led to
a restructuring of the relationship between the two: a
delicate form of power sharing in which the prime minister
took responsibility for most domestic policies, while the
president retained a measure of authority in foreign affairs
and national defense, as well as a vaguely defined influence
in internal affairs. After the reelection of Mitterrand as
president in 1988, and the recapture of control of the
Assembly by the Socialists immediately thereafter, the
situation returned to normal, with the president's
preeminence reestablished. (i4)
(14) William Safran, "France," Politics in Western Europe,
M. Donald Hancock, David P. Conradt, B. Guy Peters and
William Safran eds . (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers,
Inc., 1993) 108-109.
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Agricultural policy is usually made and carried out in
the executive branch. However, sometimes the government
asks the National Assembly to give opinions on issues of
importance such as the Uruguay Round agricultural issues.
In a formal sense, Parliament has been weakened by the
constitution as well as by the legislature's own standing
orders. Nevertheless, that institution is not so weak that
it can be dismissed. Although in most cases the initiative
belongs to the government, deputies have succeeded in
significantly modifying government bills through
amendment
.
(15) The conservatives are more attuned to
markets and open trade than are the socialists, but also are
willing to play to the farmers' lobby. There was not much
conflict in relation to the decision-making of agricultural
policy when the president and the prime minister represented
the same party. When they are different, it is mostly the
cabinet represented by the majority in the National Assembly
that decides and carries out agricultural policy.
Because of the EC's CAP, however, many parts of the
agricultural policy in France follows rules and regulations
imposed by the EC because the European Commission or the
European Council are engaged in the decisions of many parts
of member countries' agricultural policy.
(15) Safran 159.
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France is characterized by the presence of two major
farmers' organizations: FNSEA (National Federation of
Farmers) and CNJJA (National Center for Young Farmers)
.
Furthermore, there are three minor unions: FFA (French
Federation of Agriculture)
, MODEF (Movement for the Defence
of Family Farms)
,
and the Confederation Paysanne, which was
the result of a secession from the previous two
organizations in the early 1960s. After World War II the
reconstruction of the agricultural trade union movement was
centered on FNSEA and CNJA and was inspired by the renewed
rural Catholic movement (JAC, Young Christian Farmers)
.
CNJA and JAC were protagonists in the process of
agricultural modernization developed in France from 1960 and
1980 where, they were effective partners. Their strategy of
productive modernization has been an element of cohesion for
a large majority of French farmers who are owners of farms
large enough to accept the challenge of market competition.
The role of principal interacting partners granted to them
by the government has allowed them to become centers for the
dispensation of services. Furthermore, FNSEA and CNJA have
maintained a strong and active presence in the cooperative
movement, whose leaders have been elected thanks to the
support received from these trade unions. (i6)
(16) For details, see Alessandro Bonanno, Agrarian Policies
and Agricultural Systems (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990)
200-212
.
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b. Farm Support Programs and the Importance of
Agriculture
French farmers, who produce most of the EC surplus,
would suffer greatly if EC agricultural export subsidies
were significantly reduced or eliminated. (i?) France has
received substantial amount of EC subsidy: nearly 5.8
billion ecus ($6.4 billion) in 1990, more than Holland and
Britain put together. The French government added
bucketfuls of its own on top: direct subsidies to farmers
from the agriculture ministry totalled around $2.3 billion
in 1991, about twice as much as in 1982. Programs of fam
income support were mostly aimed at those with low incomes.
However, other farmers who are in financial difficulties
were also beneficiaries of the programs. About 70,000
farmers had high debt levels in 1990s. Two farm groups were
very vulnerable to the indebtedness: large farms run by
young farmers with recent high levels of investment: and
small farms run by elderly farmers with low return. In
1989, many parts of the aid payments were given for those
suffered by the drought. Subsidies usually have benefitted
animal breeders more than any other categories.
(17) H. Wayne Moyer, "The European Community and the GATT
Uruguay Round: Preserving the Common Agricultural Policy at
All Costs," World Agriculture and the GATT . William P.
Avery, ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993)
116 .
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The French government would also lose if EC subsidies
were reduced because agricultural exports provided a very
important component of national export earnings. In the
1980s, while France's trade balance in manufactured goods
went deeper into the red, its surplus in agricultural
products steadily increased. A net importer of food
products at the start of the 1960s, France has become the
world's second-biggest food exporter, behind only the US.
Europe was the key to this success. France accounted for
almost a quarter of the EC's food production, and nearly
three-quarters of France's food exports in 1991 went to
other EC countries
.
(is) The net benefit for France of a new
GATT agreement, as compared to no agreement at all, was more
questionable than for any other major EC country.
French agricultural policy assumes that expansion of
farm exports would contribute to a whole range of desirable
goals: improving the balance of payments, alleviating
unemployment, combating inflation, preventing the economic
and social decline of disadvantaged regions, closing the gap
between farm productivity in France and in agriculturally
more advanced countries of the Community, and developing the
country's only major natural resource. Given the relative
decline in the trade surplus with the rest of the EC, French
(18) "French farmers: Trouble in the fields of Elysium," The
Economist, September 19, 1992: 21.
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policy aims at adding value to agricultural exports by
further processing, thus increasing earnings from this
field. The national cast of agricultural policy has been
reinforced by the vigorous pursuit of structural policies
since the orientation laws (lois d' orientation) of 1960 and
1962. These marked a turning point. Previously,
officialdom protected agriculture by tariffs or price
supports in response to pressure from the farm lobbies. It
amounted to rather passive protectionism with overtones of
patronage. With the advent of the Fifth Republic and the
shrinkage of farming as a society within society, government
has promoted food as a whole, including food processing,
fertilizer and chemical production and farm machinery
production, in a positive, expansionist way, as one sector
among the many others to which similar treatment is
accorded. Before the war, government spending on
agricultural promotion represented under 1 percent of
agricultural output. In the 1950s, this climbed to 10
percent; in the 1960s to 12 percent; and since 1973 to 16
percent
.
Since 1962, French policy has focused on three broad
priorities. The first has been to promote a solid stratum
of viable, two-person, medium-sized family farms for social,
regional and environmental reasons . Young farmers had to be
allowed to acquire or operate farms and settle the
countryside prosperously in as large numbers as possible to
prevent rural desertification. Second, farmers were
encouraged to act collectively mainly through producer or
marketing cooperatives. This made it possible to reap
economies of scale without mergers, increased the bargaining
power of farmers against manufacturers and retailers, and
helped them improve management and marketing, not least to
build up exports. Third, value added along the whole length
of the food chain from the farmer to the food manufacturer
was to be increased by upgrading products and encouraging
effective cooperation among the various stages in the
sector. The instruments for structural reform tended to
cluster around the Credit Agricole, producer cooperatives
and the interprofessional organizations, which link
different sectors of the food chain. The Credit Agricole is
a combination of a state bank, a cooperative agricultural
bank, which benefits from tax relief, and a bank which lends
money to house purchasers on mortgage . Government funds
subsidize interest rates to preferential borrowers, such as
new farmers or cooperatives, purchasers of land, approved
modernizers, and so on. As a result, farm borrowing and
indebtedness are high. This makes it hard to cut back
incomes for fear of ruining farmers. The interprofessional
organizations bring together farmers, food processors,
manufacturers and retailers in virtually every sector. They
have powers to collect levies and subsidies . (19)
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The variety of French natural environments has
repercussions on agricultural activity where the wealth of
contrasts, whether in land use or production, is greater
than in other European countries
.
(20) 33% (181580 km out of
549100 km) of France's total land is arable while 60% of
Denmark's, 31% of Portugal's, 30% of Spain's and Italy's,
29% of Germany's (before unification), 28% of United
Kingdom's, 25% of Belgium's, 22% of Greece's, 21% of
Luxembourg's and Netherlands' and 14% of Ireland's is
arable. (21) While there are countries in the EC that have
more percentages of arable land than France, France has
about 27% of the total arable land of the EC, the largest
share. Furthermore, while the agricultural work force in
France is smaller than that in other sectors of the economy,
it is more significant when compared with other EC nations.
Another aspect which gives agriculture importance is that
there has been an increase in the number of people working
in agriculturally related activities, that is, in agri-
business . (22)
(19) Francois Duchene, Eduward Szczepanik and Wilfrid Legg,
New Limits on European Agriculture: Politics and the Common
Acrricultural policy (New Jersey: Rowman & Assanheld, 1985)
94-97
.
(20) Philippe Pinchemel, France: A Geographical. Social and
Economic Survey . Dorothy Elkins with T. H. Elkins Trans.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1987) 271.
(21) EC, eurostat: Basic Statisti cs of the Community
(Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities: 1989) 17 and 213.
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3. EC's Decision Making Rodies and Process
The four main EC bodies making agricultural policy are
the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament and
the Court of Justice. In recent years a fifth body, the
European Council has become important in taking decisions on
contentious issues, though it has no formal role in
governance of the Community. (23)
a. Decision Making Process
The Commission holds a strategic place in the
constitution of the EC. It acts as both the initiator
of proposals and the administrator of decisions. It
controls the major part of the bureaucracy, the
Directorates-General, which run the day-to-day business of
the EC. Much of the internal action on reform consists of
proposals by the Commission to the Council of Ministers. At
the head of the Commission are the Commissioners, who
supposedly take a community view of issues, separated from
mere national advantage. They are appointed for four-year
terms by the member states. The Commissioner holding the
agricultural portfolio is responsible for submitting
(22) Pinchemel 273.
(23) Moyer and Josling 31-36.
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proposals for changing agriculture and the CAP to the other
Commissioners, meeting weekly as the College of the
Commission. He develops these proposals with the assistance
of his Cabinet and the Directorate-General for agriculture
(DG-VI)
.
How they are developed depends to a large extent
on the preferences and personality of the Commissioner.
Before submitting his proposals to the College of the
Commissioners, the Agriculture Commissioner must clear them
with affected Directorates-General and with the Commission's
legal staff. Proposals then face screening in the weekly
meeting of the chiefs of the various cabinets to set the
agenda for the weekly session of the full Commission. The
chiefs try to streamline the Commission debate by
identifying key issues as well as areas of probable
agreement. The full Commission then debates the proposals
and may approve, modify or reject them. Even though
decisions are made by simple majority vote, agreement does
not always come easily. The Commission submits its final
proposal to the Council of Ministers. In preparation for
discussion in the Council of Ministers, Commission proposals
are scrutinized in one or more committees made up of
national and Commission officials and chaired by an official
from the member state holding the presidency.
The Council of Ministers, as the decision-making body,
controls the direction and the pace of the Community. Each
member state has a seat on the Council, which it fills with
a minister from the national government. Discussions in the
Council are structured by subject matter and attended by the
ministers responsible for those subjects. Hence, the EC
has, for example, an Agriculture Council, a Finance Council
and a Foreign Affairs (or General) Council.
Council decision-making, until recently, came largely
through consensus or unanimity. This has no basis in the EC
Treaty, which provided only for voting by qualified
majority, but developed as a result of the Luxembourg
Compromise reached in January 1966. The Compromise states
that the other governments will not overrule a country which
opposes a piece of draft EC legislation on the ground that a
vital national interest is at stake. This means that the
veto has been used sparingly over the years and that other
members respected it when it was used. (24) They also tried
to avoid it from compromising.
The emergence of the European Council comes largely as
response to the fragmentation of authority among the various
Councils of Ministers, although it also serves the need to
discuss future directions for the EC. Made up of heads of
government (or, in the case of France, the head of state)
,
together with the Commission President and recently with the
President of the European Parliament, the European Council
holds summit meetings at least twice a year. In turn, the
(24) "EEC Council of Ministers: The power that be," The
Economist , February 25, 1989: 50.
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prime ministers and President of France generally make
decisions in principle, which are passed back to the Council
of Ministers for action.
Some European countries, such as France and Ireland,
are more protectionist in agricultural trade, whereas
others, such as Great Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands
are more free- trade oriented. There are some compelling
reasons why protectionist forces were strong in much of
European agriculture. About 8 percent of the EC population
lives on farms, compared with only 2 percent in the
US
.
In the twelve countries of the EC there are more than
10 million farmers (3 percent of the total population)
,
compared with only 2.5 million (1 percent of the total
population) in the US. As a result, farmers in the EC enjoy
considerable electoral weight.
The Treaty of Rome does not address the issue of the
creation of organizations representing the interests of
European agriculturalists in the EC. However, it allows the
indirect participation of agriculturalist organizations in
the preparation of community norms through farmers' presence
in some EC institutions such as the Economic and Social
Committee (ESC) and the sectoral Advisory Committees.
Agriculturalist organizations are also present in the pan-
community private organisms which are recognized by the EC
as principal interlocutors in agricultural matters. Farmers
in the EC have long had very strong domestic organizations
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to represent and articulate their views. As early as 1963,
some 100 Community
-wide agriculture groups had been formed.
By the late 1980s, this number had grown to around 150. The
most important of these groups was Committee of Professional
Agricultural Organizations (COPA) which was an umbrella or
peak organization representing all types of farmers on the
basis of affiliation through national farming groups. (25)
Others are General Committee of Agricultural Cooperatives
(COGECA)
,
European Council of Young Agriculturalists (CEJA)
,
and European Center for the Promotion and Formation of Rural
Life (CEPFAR)
. (26) So, the sheer size of the lobby was
foinnidable.
b . Farm Support Programs
The centerpiece of the Community's grain market is the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) , which is based on three
fundamental principles. First, the Community functions as a
single market for agricultural commodities. Given the
history of agricultural protectionism in the original member
countries, this implied the replacement of national price
support policies with a common price support system.
(25) Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the
European Community (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989)
281-286 .
(26) Bonanno 212-216.
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Second, preference is always given to producers within the
EC over foreign competitors. This requires the use of
import measures, such as duties and levies, to keep the
price of imported grain above that of domestically produced
grain and community prices above world prices. The third
principle states that community members jointly finance CAP
costs. This led to the creation of the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) to
administer Community agricultural expenditures.
The price support mechanism is founded on target,
intervention, and threshold prices. The target price is the
cornerstone because it determines the levels of the
intervention and threshold prices. The target price is the
farm-gate price that all farmers are entitled to receive for
their products, regardless of circumstances. Free-market
prices equal target prices only when the Community is a net
importer. In the case of the Community cereal market where
supplies are exceed domestic requirements, free-market
prices are always lower than target prices. The threshold
price is the minimum price at which grain imports are
permitted to enter the Community. The threshold price
system aims to protect Community from import competition.
The threshold price also acts as an effective ceiling price
in domestic markets because domestic grains are price-
competitive with imports up to the threshold price. A
variable levy paid by importers is charged to ensure that
all imports enter the Community at the threshold price. The
intervention price is a support price at which the Community
will purchase grain from farmers if they cannot obtain a
higher price on the open market. Community grain prices are
not supposed to fall below the intervention price, but
market prices typically lie at the lower end of the price
band because domestic supply most often exceeds demand.
Monthly adjustments are made to all support prices to
account for storage costs. These monthly increments are
meant to promote the provision of a smooth and continuous
grain supply throughout the year by removing pressure to
sell immediately after harvest. To promote private
stockholding, any stocks remaining at the end of a season
are eligible to be purchased by the Community at a price
that includes a compensation allowance, which equals the
difference between the target price for the last month of
the old season and the first month of the new season.
The EC also introduced several measures to curb
structural surpluses. To dispose of production in excess of
what can be absorbed by the domestic market at Community
prices, exporters receive export restitutions equal to the
difference between domestic and international prices. These
are paid by the Commission from the Community's budget.
Exports are closely monitored by the Commission, and the
refunds paid to exporters are calculated based on market
trends, including quality and quantity of cereals and
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internal trade costs. Other exporters label the
restitutions as export subsidies, and as EC grain exports
have grown, the payments have become an increasingly
contentious issue. In addition to the measures mentioned
above, there are also different grain policy instruments
used in the EC such as production encouragement measures
(producer guaranteed price, deficiency payments, production
quota, etc.), import discouragement measures (tariff,
variable levy quota, licensing, etc.) and export
encouragement measures (taxes, subsidies, state trading,
etc.)
. (27) The EC also uses production quotas mainly for
dairy products.
B. The Roots of Increased Confrontation over
Agricultural Issues in the 1980s (28)
While agriculture had been discussed in GATT, the issue
had generally been left aside before the Uruguay Round.
Although US-EC differences emerged over agricultural trade
issues in the 1960s, conflict was limited during much of the
(27) David Blandford and Madeleine Gauthier, "The European
Community, " North- South Grain markets and Trade Policies .
David Blandford, Colin A. Carter, and Roley Piggott
eds
.
(Boulder : Westview Press, 1993) 94-99.
(28) Theodore H. Cohn, "The Changing Role of the United
States in Global Agricultural Trade Regime," World
Agriculture and the GATT . William P. Avery ed. (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993) 29-34.
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1970s because the major grain exporters benefitted from
short supplies and an expansion of trade. A variety of
global and domestic factors, however, contributed to a
return to surplus conditions in the 1980s. Unlike the
period of surplus capacity in the 1950s and 1960s, US
hegemony had declined and the EC had emerged as a formidable
competitor. The stage was therefore set for a major
confrontation. Although a number of agricultural exporters
were adversely affected by excess capacity in the early
1980s, the problems were particularly severe for the US,
whose share of global wheat exports fell sharply. One of
the factors in the loss of US competitiveness was the EC's
export subsidies
.
(29)
The agricultural trade surplus of the US with the EC
fell from $7.5 billion in 1980 to $2.5 billion in 1986, but
the US was even more concerned about growing EC competition
for third world country markets. Although Western Europe
had traditionally been a net agricultural importer, the EC
dependence on food imports declined with the postwar
recovery and the creation of the CAP. In the 1980s, the EC
(29) During that time the US was actually losing
competitiveness in agriculture. Alan Barkema, Mark
Drabenstott, and Luther Tweeten, "The Competitiveness of US
Agriculture in the 1990s," Agricultural Pol icies in a New
Decade . Kristen Allen ed. (Washington: Resource for the
Future and National Planning Association, 1990) 257-258.
They argue that plummeting foreign demand triggered by
sluggish foreign income growth, a soaring US dollar, and
rapidly expanding rain production abroad took a huge toll on
US farm exports.
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became a net exporter of grains, and it benefitted greatly
from the rising value of the US dollar.
The US at first attempted, m vain, to work mainly
through the GATT to produce a change in EC agricultural
policies. Frustrated with its GATT efforts, the US then
moved to engage the EC more directly in an export subsidy
contest. The US had export subsidy programs in the 1950s
and 1960s when government price supports were far above
international levels. However, these programs were
discontinued during the period of grain shortages in 1973
and did not reemerge as a policy instrument until 1983. The
US Department of Agriculture opposed export subsidies in
principle, and the Reagan Administration tended to view
them as unfair trade practices. Nevertheless, under
pressure from the Senate leadership and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) , the US established an
Export Enhancement Program (EEP) in May 1985 to regain its
lost market share and to force the EC to the bargaining
table. The EEP authorized the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) to offer government -owned commodities as bonuses to US
exporters to expand sales of agricultural products. The
bonuses were, in fact, a form of export subsidy because
exporters could sell commodities abroad at prices that were
below domestic levels, (bo) The EEP contributed to a US-EC
export subsidy war, which lowered world grain prices, and
smaller exporter countries found it difficult to compete.
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The US government indicated that the EEP would target only
EC markets, and initially its policies were consistent with
these assurances. However, smaller exporters felt that US
statements were belied by its actions when the EEP was
extended to the Soviet Union, where 48 percent of the market
was served by non-subsidizing competitors.
There was also a difference in the US and the EC
policies on crop size. The US had policies limiting
plantings of subsidized crops, basically because the
government decided in the late 1960s or early 1970s that it
did not want to have to pay for storing surplus crops. The
EC did not have anything comparable until the late 1980s and
1990s. Surpluses all went into EC stockpiles, and the EC
had major incentive to sell them cheap or even give them
away because the storage costs were getting so high.
The adverse coalition of fourteen so-called fair
trading countries formed the Cairns Group in 1986, with the
joint goal of pressuring for an end to the US-EC export
subsidy war. The US defended itself against Cairns Group
criticisms by pointing out that it was also a victim of EC
policy, and to demonstrate its resolve for reform, the US
(30) The bonuses are certificates good or payment -in-kind.
As government stocks fell in 1991, payment in cash often
replaced payment -in-kind to exporters. For details, see
Jane M. Porter and Douglas E. Bowers, A Short History of US
Agricultural Trade Negotiations (Washington: US Government
Printing Office, 1989) 19, Rapp 131-147, and Tweene 258.
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submitted broad- ranging agricultural proposals to the GATT
Uruguay Round in July 1987.
C. The Main Agricultural Issues of the Uruguay Round
Three major agricultural trade issues- trade distorting
price or income support to farmers and export subsidies,
agricultural import barriers, and health and sanitary import
restrictions- were under consideration in the agricultural
negotiations. (31)
1. Price or Income Support and Export Subsidies
Farm price and income support policies in the US, the
EC and other industrialized member countries of GATT provide
incentives for surplus production. These surpluses are then
exported to other countries, often at subsidized prices.
These same commodity price and income support policies often
led to the imposition of barriers against imports to protect
farmers from foreign competition. In the 1980s, this
combination of domestic agricultural support and trade
policies contributed to a buildup of stocks of major traded
(31) Charles E. Hanrahan, "Agriculture in the GATT," Review
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Under the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade. US
Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1991) CRS2-3.
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commodities, deterioration of commodity prices and
aggressively subsidized competition for export markets. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
estimated that in 1986 the costs of agricultural support and
protection in the EC and the US exceeded $100 billion.
Supporters of agricultural trade liberalization argue
that government support policies lead to excess production,
trade distortions, large budget outlays for export and other
subsidies, and high costs to consumers. Economists argue
further that government support to agriculture, because it
influences farmers' production decisions, contributes to a
misallocation of global resources, is wasteful, reduces
world agricultural output by imposing quotas, and diminishes
global welfare.
Farm support policies, however, have the backing of
farm and commodity groups that are beneficiaries of the
programs
. These groups are not always amenable to
negotiating policy shifts, particularly in an international
forum. Despite some evidence that taxpayers and consumers
are more aware of the large costs of supporting US farmers'
incomes, farm programs often get broad support in Congress.
In the EC, farm organizations also back government support
programs. Many EC consumer groups and others also back
expensive farm support programs because they see them as
critical for restraining growth in urban unemployment and
for protecting the environment.
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.
Import Barriers
GATT member countries use a variety of non- tariff
barriers to impede import access to their markets. Quotas,
variable import levies, and agreements to voluntarily
restrain exports were among the barriers most frequently
employed. In general, the GATT rules governing the use of
barriers to imports of agricultural products are weak in the
case of quotas and nonexistent in the case of variable
levies or voluntary export restraints. There is, moreover,
no generally agreed upon approach in the GATT for
negotiating modifications in non-tariff barriers.
3 Health and Sanitary Regulations
GATT member countries employ numerous health and
sanitary standards to regulate trade. Proponents of these
standards say they were established to protect the health
and safety of consumers of imported products, but critics
charge that often they were used to restrict trade in order
to protect domestic producers from import competition.
Trade negotiators were trying to harmonize standards across
countries, and improve dispute settlement procedures so that
legitimate standards could be distinguished from
illegitimate and so that distortions in the international
flow of goods could be reduced. Environmentalists and
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consumer groups in the US and Europe have expressed their
concern that harmonized GATT standards for health and
sanitary measures may be weaker than national standards.
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CHAPTER IV
DEADLOCK IN THE URUGUAY ROUND
The new Round of multilateral trade negotiations within
the GATT was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay in
September 1986. The Ministerial Declaration recognized the
urgent need to stabilize the world agriculture market and
called for a greater liberalization of trade through
-improving market access by reducing import barriers;
-improving the competitive environment by limiting the
use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures
directly or indirectly affecting agricultural trade; and
-minimizing the adverse effects of sanitary regulations
and barriers to trade in agriculture. (i)
These points were reaffirmed by an OECD ministerial
meeting in May 1987. At the Venice Summit in June 1987, the
Group of seven leaders reaffirmed the commitment to
agricultural trade reform set out in the OECD communique.
The Ministerial Declaration adopted by GATT members at
Punta del Este established the Group of Negotiations on
Goods (GNG) to carry out the negotiations. The GNG
established the various negotiating groups, developed their
negotiating plans, coordinated their work and supervised the
progress of the negotiations. There were 14 negotiating
(1) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Activities
1986 (Geneva: GATT, 1988) 21.
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groups, including one for agriculture
. (2 ) Several of these
groups could affect the agriculture group, including the
groups on tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical products,
subsidies, and natural resources.
There were several attempts to reach an agreement on
agriculture including other issue areas of the Round from
1987 through 1990 when the Round was scheduled to be
finalized. However, this period was characterized by the
big differences in the positions of the US and the EC.
A. Initial Proposals and Responses (1987-88)
1. Proposals and Reactions
The initial phase of the Uruguay Round was highlighted
by the submission of proposals by the US and other GATT
participants on the liberalization of agricultural trade.
This phase was essentially completed by the end of 1987.
US agricultural policy officials made repeated attempts
to reform these domestic agricultural support policies by
reducing the level at which prices and income receive
guaranteed public support. Their efforts, however, had been
firmly opposed by domestic farm lobbies through the
influence they exerted within the agricultural committees of
(2) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Activities
1986 13-14.
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the US Congress. (3) Accordingly, when official preparations
began for the new Uruguay Round these recently defeated
Reagan administration officials sensed an opportunity to
pursue their domestic objective of farm policy reform
through an international negotiation. Consequently, they
took an early lead in insisting that negotiations on
domestic agricultural policy reform should become a key
component of the larger Uruguay Round.
EC decision makers, defending the highly protectionist
CAP, accepted inclusion of agricultural trade issues into
the negotiations only reluctantly. This reluctance was
overcome only when rapidly escalating farm subsidy costs in
the mid-1980s threatened to break the EC budget,
necessitating an unpopular increase in the Community's
value-added tax or an equally unpopular decrease in EC
spending. This tended to increase the impetus for trade
liberalization and weakened the European farm lobby. An
important political development, the creation of the Single
European Market, seemed to reinforce this effect because the
budget crisis prevented expenditures needed for policy
harmonization. Strong pressures from the US and the Cairns
Group provided a reinforcing impetus too.
In a statement of July 6, 1987, President Reagan noted
that at the heart of the US proposal was the elimination.
(3) Rapp 41.
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over a ten year period, of all export subsidies, all
barriers to each other's markets (including tariffs and
quotas), and all domestic subsidies that affected trade.
Farm policies that provided payments to farmers without
affecting pricing or production decisions (decoupled
payments) and bona fide food aid could be continued. Also,
worldwide food health regulations should be harmonized to
prevent them from being used as non-tariff barriers. (4)
The EC External Relations Commissioner stated in early
October that the aim of the EC proposal was to cleanse the
agricultural sector and to stop the subsidy war. The
proposal noted that the root problem encouraging world
agricultural trade war was the imbalance in supply and
demand. While it essentially called for a gradual reduction
in farm subsidies worldwide, it also called for special
arrangements to deal with three problem sectors- grain,
dairy products, and sugar- in the short term. (5) During the
(4) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations (Washington: GAO, 1988) 17. Decoupled payment
means removing the link between government farm payments and
crop production. A farmer can choose to take income- support
payments based on previous production of a particular crop,
no matter what crop is planted in the future, or whether a
crop is planted at all
.
(5) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations 25
.
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Table 1- Value of total agricultural exports, United
States, fiscal years 1977-1991
Year ending Total Agricultural percentage
exports exports of total
export
Million($) Million($) Percent
1977 119 , 118 23, 974 20
1978 131, 559 27 , 289 21
1979 167, 818 31, 979 19
1980 210, 327 40 , 481 19
1981 229, 203 43 , 780 19
1982 215, 405 39, 097 18
1983 194 , 142 34, 769 18
1984 208, 041 38, 027 18
1985 210 , 437 31, 201 15
1986 205 , 603 26 , 312 13
1987 230 , 787 27, 876 12
1988 293 , 972 35, 316 12
1989 340, 859 39, 590 12
1990 366, 279 40, 220 11
1 991 7Q4 9qi ^7 anQ 1 n
Source: US Department of Agriculture, Agricultural
Statistics 1992 (Washington: US Government Printing
Office, 1992) 484.
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first stage, emergency measures would be taken to stabilize
the world markets for those commodities. During the second
stage, there would be a progressive and substantial decline
in government support for farmers. The EC proposal also
provided for aid to farmers as long as it would not produce
unwanted effects on output. It also included provisions for
harmonizing health and sanitary regulations pertaining to
animals and plant products. (e)
The US proposal got a mixed reception from other GATT
members. The EC official stated that the objective of
eliminating all subsidies and import restrictions was not
only overly ambitious but also overlooked the fact that
agriculture is different in the various countries. He noted
that the US proposal was calling for greater liberalization
in agriculture than existed in the industrial sector. It
went too far for the EC which, while willing to reduce price
support and market access restrictions, was not willing to
eliminate them. The official stated that this concern
reflected social and political considerations more than
economic ones. France and Germany too raised similar
objections, adding that eliminating such supports was not
politically feasible for the EC. The Cairns Group, however,
expressed support for the US proposal, viewing it as a good
(6) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations 25
.
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starting point and agreeing with its comprehensive
approach. (7)
Even in the US there was a mixed reception. Several
commodity group and farm representatives believed the US
proposal to be a good negotiating strategy, because it
sought the absolute optimal scenario, and a good first step.
However, some also noted that it was neither realistic nor
feasible. They said it was not realistic because they
doubted that other countries, especially the EC would
dismantle their domestic support programs and eliminate all
trade distorting policies. They also regarded it as not
feasible because they believed it politically impossible to
eliminate all supports, both domestically and abroad. (s)
The EC proposal was not welcomed by the US or the
Cairns Group. Some observers felt the proposal was too
vague and reflected a desire to please the various member
countries without making any real concessions. In the
proposal, the EC indicated that it would not accept any
change in the two-price system of its CAP. US negotiators
(7) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations 20-21. According to the author of this report,
the officials in the US General Accounting Office went to
Brussels and interviewed delegates not only from the US but
also from other countries to find out the responses to the
proposals of the US and the EC. So, opinions expressed here
by the officials from EC, France, Germany, the Cairns Group
and the US are based on their interviews. However, this
report does not show specifically whom was interviewed.
(8) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations 30-31.
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were worried that if the short-term measures were to be
agreed upon, then the EC and others would have less
incentive to agree to the more important long-term
liberalization of agricultural trade. Also, although the
exact nature of the short-term measures was not specified,
US observers felt that the EC was proposing sort of market
-
sharing agreement for the grain, sugar and dairy sectors.
Such market -sharing arrangements were contrary to US market
-
oriented trade policies. (9)
2. An Explanation of the Differences in Proposals
Although US proposal was considered by some, including
the Cairns Group, to be a good first negotiating step, many
groups in the US and elsewhere felt that the US demands were
unrealistic and certain to promote instability in the
agricultural trade regime. In particular, the US government
could be faulted for failing to fully appreciate the
significance of agriculture in a European context. European
farm policies also placed considerable emphasis on social
and ecological as well as economic objectives. Furthermore,
some major EC agricultural products (such as wheat in
France) would be far less competitive under free-market
conditions. The US government, therefore, may have
(9) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations 25-26.
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underestimated European resistance to any basic changes in
domestic farm programs
.
(lo) Similarly, the EC may have
underestimated the resolve of the US. Budgetary pressure
meant that the willingness of the US government to reform
the agricultural support system was stronger in the Uruguay
Round than in previous Rounds
.
The US also may have underestimated the degree to which
its ability to force changes upon the EC had declined. A
1989 report of the US Department of Agriculture's Office of
the Inspector General found that the Export Enhancement
Program (EEP) did not have much impact on the EC's market
share. To continue its sales, the EC had to spend somewhat
more on export restitutions. Although the EEP was one of
the factors that brought the EC to the negotiating table,
the EC has continued to resist external pressures for
change
.
(ii)
The strong US stance against EC policies in the Uruguay
Round was yet another indication that the US had changed its
position on the linkage of trade and political -security
issues. (12) In the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, the US had
agreed to expanding market opportunities for trade in
manufactures, despite the EC's unwillingness to make the
(10) Cohn 30.
(11) Cohn 31.
(12) Cohn 32-33 .
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desired agricultural concessions. One factor in the US
flexibility was its reluctance to risk the political
consequences of a failure of the trade negotiations as a
whole given their relationship to broad security policy. In
the Uruguay Round, by contrast, the US was far more adamant
in linking the outcome of the agricultural negotiations with
the results of the entire Round. The US had become less
willing to make economic sacrifices for strategic-security
reasons, largely because of changing cold war relationships
and growing US economic problems.
It also should be noted that it was more difficult for
the US and the EC to mask their differences because a number
of countries were taking a more active stance regarding the
agricultural trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round. At
the GATT Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, the US had settled for
less in agriculture because of its desire to reach agreement
in other areas; but this solution was not necessarily
feasible at the Uruguay Round even if the US had opted for
it. The Cairns Group was an important new actor calling for
major reductions in internal support and export subsidies,
and eleven of its fourteen members were less -developed
countries (LDCs) . By its heterogeneity, the Cairns Group
could be regarded as a coalition unlike any other in the
contemporary international political economy. Prominent
within the group were Australia and Canada which was joined
not only by New Zealand, another like-minded country, but
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also by a variety of "unlike" countries, namely Brazil,
Hungary, Indonesia, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Fiji,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. (13)
Cairns Group states, however, had important commonalities.
Each had a highly competitive export
-oriented agricultural
sector, with agricultural exports representing from 18
percent to as high as 73 percent of total exports. The high
percentage of the agricultural exports of the Group members
could be contrasted with the figures of 17 percent for the
US, 1 percent for Japan, 7 percent for West Germany, 8
percent for Great Britain, 9 percent for Italy, and 19
percent for France. In addition, all of the Cairns Group
states played an important role individually or collectively
in a large proportion of the world's agricultural markets.
They provided from 21.4 to 91.8 percent of the world market
in thirteen different commodities
.
(14)
Agricultural producers in the Cairns Group wanted
fairer trade because they were not getting export subsidies.
They were efficient producers who needed foreign markets in
(13) Andrew F. Cooper and Richard Higgott, "Australian and
Canadian Approaches to the Cairns Group: Two-Level Games and
the Political Economy of Adjustment," World Agriculture and
the GATT . William P. Avery ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1993) 121-122.
(14) Richard A. Higgott and Andrew Fenton Cooper, "Middle
power leader and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns
Group, and the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations,"
International Organization 44,4 (Autumn 1990) 601-605.
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order to take full advantage of their efficiency. At the
same time, the governments of these countries were in no
position to compete with the US and the EC in offering
export subsidies. Agricultural interests in these countries
wanted both reduction or end of export subsidies and
reduction or end of import barriers. So a number of the
LDCs threatened to turn down agreements in other areas, such
as services and intellectual property, if no agreement was
reached on agriculture, and some Latin American states
backed up this threat when they led a walkout at the 1988
mid-term GATT review meeting in Montreal. (15)
However, the Cairns Group's willingness to settle
differences in the agricultural trade reform in the Uruguay
Round made, in some sense, the strong opposition of the
French farm lobby groups more conspicuous. In other words,
the stronger the Cairns Group's desire to make the
agricultural trade reform possible, the more it seemed the
French government's intransigence in the negotiations could
not be ignored. This situation therefore led negotiators
(15) It is undeniable that the position of the EC continued
to differ sharply from those of the US and the Cairns Group.
It is also true that, at the early stage of the
negotiations, the incremental and flexible approach of the
Cairns Group remained at odds with the US proposal for
agricultural negotiations, which notwithstanding its status
as a negotiating tool, called for the complete phase out of
all barriers to import access and subsidies over a ten-year
period although the position of the Cairns Group was mostly
in line with that of the US during the Uruguay Round
negotiations
.
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from the US and the EC to think that they had to meet some
parts of the needs of the opposing country, France, in order
to make the negotiations successful by preventing the Cairns
Group from withdrawing from the overall Uruguay Round
negotiations
.
We can understand this standstill in the negotiations
by comparing the win- sets of the negotiators. First of all,
the win- sets of the EC on agricultural reform were small.
Win-sets of the EC on the other sectors of economy, however,
were relatively large and could contribute to enlarging win-
sets in agricultural issues. In contrast, in the US side,
win-sets in agricultural reform were large only if the
condition was met that the EC also agreed to correspondingly
cut its subsidies. The responses of the lobby groups and
the Congress to the American proposal show this . The
problem, however, was that no overlap existed in the win-
sets between the two countries because of the clear
differences in the opinions about subsidies. As a result,
in the initial stage of the Uruguay Round agricultural
negotiations, negotiators could not reach agreement.
However, a small domestic win- set in the EC became a
bargaining advantage and could make it possible that
President Reagan softened farm proposal stance in 1988. As
Putnam says in his analysis, because the cost of no-
agreement to farmers in several EC member countries was low,
their win-sets could not but be small.
But the possibility still remained that the Uruguay
Round would succeed because some constituents in the EC
faced high costs from no-agreement. For example, farmers
were willing to oppose any agreement which would cut
subsidies they received. Otherwise, they would lose huge
amount of support given by the EC. By comparison, those who
were working in the industrial sectors wanted agreement to
be reached because they found the successful conclusion of
the Uruguay Round would be beneficial to them.
In the real negotiation process, however, the influence
of farm groups was more powerful than others. Farm issues
in the Uruguay Round had been highly politicized by the farm
lobby groups. The farm lobby groups were activated and took
very extreme positions, and negotiators from each side had
to take into consideration the presence of the farm lobby
groups
.
In relation to ratification procedure, it is noteworthy
that US congressional ratification was conducted under a
special fast -track authority whose rules -including no
amendments, limited debate, and a single up-or-down vote on
the entire agreement -greatly favored ratification. This
system was expected to expand the win- set of the US
negotiators. In the EC, formal approval after a GATT
negotiation would not come from the Commission of the
European Community, but instead from the Council of Foreign
Ministers where members could wield a veto in the decision
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making process. The actual decision would be made in the
113 Committee, dominated by member country trade ministers.
This situation reduced the win-set of EC negotiators. The
procedural characteristics in the Uruguay Round negotiations
that rejecting one issue like the agricultural reform
package would mean rejecting the rest of the Uruguay Round
as well, including the results of all the parallel
negotiations on services, intellectual property, dispute
settlement, investment and all the rest, also played into
the hands of recalcitrants. Groups or governments who
opposed deals in the agricultural issues were encouraged to
exploit others' willingness to reach a compromise.
Moreover, different political process of the US and the
EC was a factor in the determinant of the win- set size. The
US political process, with the division of power between
President and Congress, tended to give interest groups more
access points and hence more chances to try for influence
over policy. The typical EC member has a fused executive
and legislature in that the executive is formed by the
leaders of the party of coalition forming a majority in the
legislature. This reduced the access points, though it
meant any interest favored by the executive is automatically
in favor with the legislature or vice-versa. In the US, it
was possible for interest groups to be favored by one branch
but not by the other.
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B. Revi sed Proposals (1988-1990)
1. Proposals after the De Zeeuw Paper
The second phase of the negotiations began in January
1988. Although the various GATT participants supplemented
their initial proposals with additional papers and
proposals, many observers believed that the negotiations had
lost much of the momentum which had existed during the first
year of negotiations.
A mid-term review meeting at the ministerial level was
held in Montreal, Canada, in December 1988. Although
framework agreements were reached in 11 of the 15
negotiating groups at that time, there was no agreement on
agriculture, textiles, import safeguards or intellectual
property. Several Latin American members of the Cairns
Group refused to accept any overall framework agreement
unless there was agreement in agriculture. By April 1989,
following further negotiations, GATT participants did reach
framework agreements in the four remaining areas. The April
1989 framework agreement on agriculture called for
substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support
and protection, sustained over an agreed period of time,
resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and
distortions in world agricultural markets. While many
viewed that language as an indication that the US was
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retreating from its initial July 1987 proposal that all
trade-distorting support to agriculture be eliminated, US
negotiators stated that substantial progressive reductions
would ultimately lead to the elimination of such
support
. (16
)
In the April 1989 agreement, the trade negotiators
established a work plan for completing the negotiations.
They also agreed, for the short term, to freeze domestic
protection, export support, and import protection at levels
prevailing in 1989. The US submitted a comprehensive
proposal in October 1989. During the next few months, the
EC, the Cairns Group and Japan submitted their own
comprehensive proposals.
The differences between the US and the EC on
agricultural trade reform continued into 1990. At the
ministerial meeting of the OECD in Paris in May 1990, the EC
and US officials publicly disagreed as to the structure of
agricultural trade reform. The EC maintained that an
agreement needed only to specifically address internal
support while the US insisted that the three areas of
internal support, market access, and export subsidies should
all be addressed.
(16) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations: Stalemate in the Uruguay Round (Washington:
GAO, 1991) 8.
69
At the conclusion of the July 1990 Economic Summit of
the G-7 countries in Houston, Texas, there was a joint
statement supporting the use of a paper submitted by the
Chairman of the Agricultural Negotiating Group, Aart de
Zeeuw, as a means to intensify the negotiations
.
(17) The de
Zeeuw paper addressed the four areas of internal support,
border protection, export competition and health and
sanitary regulations and barriers. Under this framework,
all internal supports including price supports, deficiency
payments and input and marketing subsidies that distort
trade would be substantially reduced using aggregate measure
of support . (18)
A new US proposal based on the de Zeeuw paper called
for the most trade-distorting internal support measures to
be reduced by 75 percent over 10 years and other trade-
distorting measures to be reduced by 30 percent. All non-
tariff import access barriers would be converted to tariffs,
existing tariffs would be frozen and the newly converted and
existing tariffs would be reduced by an average of 75
percent over 10 years. For products currently subject to
non- tariff import barriers, minimum access commitments would
be set and subsequently expanded by 75 percent over 10
(17) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations: Stalemate in the Uruguay Round 9.
(18) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations: Stalemate in the Uruguay Round 9.
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years using a tariff rate quota mechanism. The tariff rate
quotas would be eliminated after 10 years. The proposal
called for export subsidies on primary agricultural products
to be reduced by 90 percent over 10 years. Export subsidies
on processed agricultural products would be phased out in 6
years . (19)
The new EC proposal, however, was less broad. It
called for a reduction of internal supports for such
commodities as cereals, rice, sugar, oilseeds, livestock and
dairy products by 30 percent from 1986 to 1996; for other
commodities, such as fruits and vegetables and tobacco, the
reduction would be 10 percent. With respect to market
access, the proposal called for converting variable levies
'and other non-tariff barriers to tariffs. Tariffs would
consist of a fixed and a variable component. The EC
proposal made no specific commitment to reduce newly
converted tariffs. It also contained only the possibility
of reducing existing tariffs through a request/ offer basis.
It also called for rebalancing, which would allow for the
reduction of support and protection of cereal substitutes,
derivatives and oilseeds. The proposal contained no precise
commitment on export subsidies; rather, it noted that the
proposed reduction of support and protection would lead to a
considerable lowering of export subsidies . (20)
(19) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
negotiations: Stalemate in the Uruguay Round 10-11.
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The main points of difference between the US and the EC
proposals included the scale of the reduction in internal
support and border protection, ranging from 3 0 to 75
percent, the nature and scope of commitments on reduction in
export subsidies which participants were prepared to assume
some of which went as far as a 90 percent reduction, the
reference year for the calculation of the commitments and
the exceptions and corrections to be made to
tariff ication
.
(21)
There was no sign of compromise between two sides, a
situation that continued until December 1990 when the
Uruguay Round was scheduled to be concluded in its entirety.
At the opening of the December 1990 ministerial meeting in
Brussels, however, the US trade representative reiterated
the US position that success in the Uruguay Round was not
possible without fundamental reform of world agricultural
trade. The EC rejected the offer presented by the Swedish
chairman of the agriculture negotiating group for a 30
percent reduction in support but using 1990, rather than
1986 as a base. (22) Efforts to break the stalemate between
the US and the EC failed.
(20) General Accounting Office, Agricultural Trade
Negotiations: Stalemate in the Uruguay Round 11.
(21) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Activities
1990 (Geneva: GATT, 1991) 35.
(22) Moyer 120.
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2. An Explanation of Continuing Deadlock
Perhaps the most important thing that stood out in the
July to December 1990 phase of the agricultural trade
negotiations is that the forces supporting the CAP in
unchanged form seized the initiative and dominated the EC
decision making process until the breakdown of negotiations
in Brussels in December. The dominant actors on the EC side
were the Agriculture Commissioner, the Directorate General
for Agriculture and the Agriculture Council . The External
Affairs Commissioner who had overall responsibility for the
negotiations, his Directorate General and the General
Council were never able to control the EC position on
agricultural trade policy. None of the many industrial and
commercial groups in the EC with a strong interest in a
successful Uruguay Round were able to influence the EC
agricultural trade policy stance or to successfully trade
off EC farm interests.
The explanation for this phenomenon is probably
multifaced. (23) First, the farm lobby had the greatest and
most immediate interest in the Uruguay Round outcome and
hence had the strongest incentive to commit resources to
protecting its interests. At the most fundamental level,
asymmetric farm lobby pressures on member governments.
(23) Moyer 116.
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particularly Germany and France, prevented any concessions
that would have threatened the CAP. The support of member .
governments for the CAP created an environment permissive
for the takeover of the agricultural negotiations by the
Directorate General for Agriculture, the Agriculture
Commissioner, and the Agriculture Council. They, in turn,
had every incentive to mobilize their full resources to
protect large existing benefits for their constituencies,
which would be reduced by a successful agreement.
The structuring of the GATT negotiations and the EC
structure of decision making actually shielded the farm
interests from outside influences. Creating a separate GATT
negotiating group to handle agricultural trade issues made
it difficult to bring non- agricultural interests to bear or
to trade agriculture concessions for concessions in other
areas. The dominant position of the Agricultural Council in
the trade policy process created further difficulties
because it was extremely receptive to the EC farm lobby and
not at all receptive to industrial and services sector
interests. It was even hard to bring international
political pressures to bear on EC agriculture ministers,
because their careers mostly depend how well
they serve
their domestic agricultural constituencies.
The portrayal of the Uruguay Round
agricultural
negotiations in the press and elsewhere as a
struggle
between the US and the EC also strengthened
the pro-CAP
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forces in the EC debate, limited flexibility, and reduced
the EC win- set. Concessions could always be construed as
caving in to the US, which was politically unacceptable
.
(24
)
This is an example of negative reverberation, where
developments at the GATT level of the bargaining process had
created impressions that the EC had been defeated.
A number of economic trends and political developments
in the policy environment strengthened the pro- CAP elements
in the EC in 1989-90.(25) First, although EC expenditures
for the CAP were increasing, they were still under budget
for 1990 and considerably under the guidelines for
agriculture established by the 1988 Brussels Agreement.
This meant that finance ministers, prime ministers and EC
commissioners holding non-agricultural dossiers had much
less incentive to challenge the protectors of the CAP. The
liberation of Eastern Europe was an important political
development that consumed a great deal of the time of
Agriculture Commissioner and his Director General and
limited the attention they could give to GATT matters. This
also favored the farm lobby.
The December 1990 all-German election was another
important political development. It kept Chancellor Kohl
from contemplating any sacrifice of German farm interests
(24) Moyer 111.
(25) Moyer 111.
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until after the election. This occurred the day before the
start of the final Brussels talks-too late for any
flexibility. The conflict in the Gulf probably also helped
farm interests in that it diverted attention away from the
GATT.
Stalemate reinforced agricultural interests in the US
as well. According to Robert Paarlberg, almost from the
moment that US officials chose to describe agricultural
reform as the make-or-break element in the larger GATT
negotiations, US domestic farm lobby groups had their own
ideas about protecting themselves from the
internationalization of the subsidy reduction effort. (26)
They found they had several great advantage on their side.
US farm lobbies were assisted by the immediate reluctance of
EC and Japanese government officials to join US officials in
an enthusiastic embrace of the reform objective. US farm
lobbies were also assisted by an excessively ambitious
official US negotiating strategy in the Round. The July
1987 proposal was labeled the "zero option" because of the
insistence of elimination of all agricultural subsidies that
distort production or trade. A surprising number of US
fam lobbies began to argue in favor of the zero option.
(26) Robert L. Paarlberg, "Why Agriculture Blocked the
Uruguay Round: Evolving Strategies in a Two-Level Game,"
World Agriculture and the GATT . William p. Avery ed.
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1993) 45-49.
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Because it allowed them to demand several things from the
negotiation. First, it allowed them to demand "no
unilateral agricultural disarmament" while the negotiations
were under way. The slogan helped farm groups to resist
some of the domestic farm subsidy cuts that might otherwise
have occurred in 1989. Farm groups and farm supporters in
Congress said no to such cuts, arguing that unilateral cuts
at home would weaken the hand of US negotiators in the GATT
talk abroad. The international talks that were intended to
facilitate domestic reform, in other words, came to be used
by farm supporters as a means to block reform. Second, the
arms control metaphor was also seized upon in an effort to
demand more subsidies, for use as bargaining chips in the
negotiation to win a better agreement in Geneva. More
interesting was the reaction of the US Congress, which was
all too eager to join the farm lobby in stressing the
competitive aspect of the international negotiation.
Congress found it easy to agree that agricultural reform was
a global problem, and then to view it as mostly a problem of
unfair subsidized foreign competition for US farmers. This
view allowed members of Congress to support the negotiations
and attack farm subsidies without angering any US farmers.
The subsidies they wanted the negotiation to attack were
mostly subsidies in the EC and Japan. (27)
The US farm lobby went even further in drawing tactical
advantages from the Uruguay Round. They demanded additional
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subsidies for themselves if and when the negotiations
finally do fail. They first did this in 1988, when they
secured Congressional adoption of an amendment to the US
Trade Act providing for expanded export subsidy spending in
the event of a failed GATT negotiation. Of course, they
were simultaneously, in 1988, blocking all progress in the
negotiation by insisting on no retreat from the zero option.
Farm lobbies improved on this tactic, however, in the fall
of 1990, when Congress wrote a GATT trigger provision into
the final budget. In the event of a failed Uruguay Round
negotiation by June 1992, this provision would oblige the
Secretary of Agriculture to spend an additional $1 billion
on export subsidies, adopt a marketing loan subsidy for
wheat and feed grains and waive acreage reductions. If the
negotiators were still deadlocked in June 1993, the
Secretary would be permitted to reverse all or part of the
$13.5 billion in domestic farm budget cuts that were finally
imposed on the US Department of Agriculture in the 1990
budget reconciliation bill.
(27) For details, see Congressional Quarterly Inc.,
Congressional Ouarterlv Almanac 1990 (Washington:
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1990) 397-398.
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C. Confrontations (1991-92)
1. Deadlock in 1991
Following the collapse of the Round, the US, the EC,
the Cairns Group negotiators and GATT officials held various
meetings to determine if there was a basis for resuming
negotiations. In late February 1991, participants agreed on
the basis for restarting the negotiations. In spite of the
agreement, what concerned the participants in the
negotiations was whether the US Congress would grant a two-
year extension of the fast-track negotiating authority for
the Uruguay Round. In March, President Bush asked Congress
to extend the fast-track and in May, he got it after fierce
discussion in Congress. In the meantime, the US
administration pushed for and won a provision in a 1991
supplemental spending bill that raised the amount of
subsidies it could offer US exporters under the EEP.
Although President Bush's stated policy was that export
subsidies should be eliminated worldwide, he wanted added
authority to use the export program in the hope that it
would spur the EC to pull back on its use of subsidies. (28)
Members of Congress urged that US government initiate the
unilateral action against the EC as a means to put pressure
(28) Congressional Quarterly Inc., Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 1991 172-174.
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on the EC to make concessions on the agricultural
issues. (29) This can be regarded as an effort by the US
Congress to enlarge the EC win- sets.
The EC, however, had its own domestic pressures to
contend with. These related largely to the negotiation of a
new farm prices package for 1991/92 coupled with difficult
negotiations among member states about Commission proposals
for the internal reform of the CAP. (30) The EC farm
ministers tried, in vain, four times to break the price cut
deadlock. {31) Despite the evident tensions, high level
political support for the speedy conclusion of the Round
appeared to remain as determined as ever. In early June,
OECD Ministers urged a substantial and comprehensive
conclusion as early as possible, preferably by the end of
the year. In July, the heads of government of the seven
largest economies at their annual G-7 summit in London
committed themselves not only to an ambitious, global and
balanced package of results by the end of 1991 but to remain
personally involved and be ready to intervene if differences
could only be resolved at the highest level. (32)
(29) Nancy Dunne, "Bush urged to revise Uruguay Round
targets," Financial Times October 17, 1991: 3.
(30) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Activities
1991 (Geneva: GATT, 1992) 20.
(31) Bruce Barnard, "EC farm ministers again try to break
price cut deadlock," Journal of Commerce and Commercial May
21, 1991: 6A.
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High level determination to succeed was reinforced by
developments that induced the EC to continue negotiations in
agricultural issues. (33) As 1991 dawned, agricultural
spending began not only to exceed the budget but the 1988
expenditure guidelines as well. This crisis was foreseen in
the Commission before the end of 1990 and the Directorate
General for Agriculture had prepared a paper. According to
it, the problem was in paying too much to the 2 0 or 2 5
percent of farmers who produced more than 80 percent of the
output while failing to support the incomes of the majority
of landholders for whose benefit the CAP was originally
established. The paper proposed that prices should be cut
to world levels with compensation to small and less
prosperous landholders by direct subsidies. The response in
the Agriculture Council to the paper was, however,
considerably less positive than that in the Commission. The
Agriculture Commissioner presented his CAP reform plan to
the ministers on February but it was received with a
distinct lack of enthusiasm. Faced with the reluctance of
the Agriculture Council to come to a decision, the
Commission acted within its authority to cut market support
expenditures for cereals, beef and milk under the
agricultural guidelines in 1991.
(32) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Activities
1991 20
.
(33) Moyer 112-115.
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However, the Commission's action was stopgap at best.
This left the Agriculture Commissioner with a dilemma. He
could let things drift and ask for an increase in the
agricultural spending guidelines. However, this would have
serious political costs because it would pit him against the
budget Commissioner and other Commissioners whose programs
would have to pay the price for an increase in agricultural
spending. The Agriculture Commissioner's other choice was
to press the Agriculture Council to take action to keep
expenditures under control . There were two ways that he
could do this. One strategy would force reform through the
1991 price package with proposals for support price cuts,
production quota reductions, and increased co-responsibility
levies (taxes on producers used to pay for production cuts)
.
The other, more long-term, strategy would propose a price
package that more or less froze supports at present levels,
but insist that the Council come to grips with a thorough-
going reform proposal later in the year. The Commissioner
seemed to move in both directions. This strategy gave EC
negotiators room for flexibility in its position. It seems
evident that the changing EC policy environment,
particularly the prospect of a budget crisis introduced by
agricultural spending, altered the EC political balance
sufficiently to increase the EC GATT win- set enough to
justify reopening the GATT negotiations.
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Another factor which contributed to hope of successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round was that at an EC-US summit
on November 9, 1991, President George Bush made a
significant move toward the EC position by lowering US
demands for cuts to 35 percent for export subsidies and 30
percent in other areas to be effected in five or six
years. (34) This situation can be interpreted properly by
the two-level games analysis. The small EC win-set for the
GATT dictated by the agricultural interest dominated EC and
member nation bargaining processes had in fact strengthened
the EC bargaining position.
Some of the obstacles at the national decision making
level had also been reduced. For example, Germany's
position has moved significantly toward accepting
compromise on agricultural trade. (35) The linkages in the
GATT of agricultural trade reform with other elements of
trade liberalization with clear benefits for Germany
strengthened the hand of the groups inside Germany who
wanted to restrain agricultural spending. Moreover, the
prospect that Germany might have to contribute more to bail
out an unreformed CAP was a very unpleasant one indeed,
(34) Facts on File, Facts on File Yearbook 1991 (New York:
Facts on File, Inc., 1992) 851-852.
(35) David Dodwell, "German move lifts Gatt talks,"
Financial Times October 14, 1991: 1.
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particularly at a time when German financial resources
heavily committed to the reintegration of East Germany.
2. An Explanation of Continued Deadlock
The most serious obstacle was France. Although the
French economy would gain significantly from the non-
agricultural elements of a successful Uruguay Round, French
agriculture would be a clear loser. The politically weak
Mitterrand regime was said to not easily be able to
withstand more massive demonstrations by farmers such as
occurred in October 1991 although at first stage President
Mitterrand warned the farmers that their protests would not
secure significant new concessions either from government or
from the EC. (36) The farm lobby still had considerable
clout in France. The farm lobby arguably accounted for
about one fifth of all votes cast. (37) So, even if the
government concluded that French interests were served by
making concessions on agriculture, one could not be sure
that it would be able to pay the political price. Though
the Socialists won the 1988 National Assembly elections and
regained control over the cabinet, it was widely expected in
(36) Ian Davidson, "Mitterrand asks police to restore
order," Financial Times October 23, 1991: 6.
(37) "French farmers: Trouble in the fields of Elysium," The
Economist September 19, 1992: 21.
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1991 that the Socialists would lose in the March 1993
Parliament elections. This situation made any kind of
concessions by the French government on agricultural issues
almost impossible. Indeed, the French government was using
the negative reverberations from the GATT negotiations to
strengthen itself by saying that it would never sacrifice
French farmers to the interests of the US.
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CHAPTER V
OVERCOMING DEADLOCK
To break the deadlock, Arthur Dunkel, GATT Director
General, introduced his proposal in December 1991. Based on
the Dunkel draft, negotiators tried, initially in vain, to
move toward the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
Afterwards, although some participants still showed their
opposition to the Dunkel draft and the oilseeds dispute
threatened the success of the Round, the US and the EC could
narrow their differences by reaching an agreement on
agriculture in Blair House in November 1992. The EC CAP
reform played a positive role in the compromise on
agriculture between the US and the EC. However, French
opposition to the farm deal began to be more conspicuous and
was thought to threaten the success of the overall Round.
Finally, as the Round was wrapped up, France got many
concessions not only from the US but also from other members
of the EC.
A. The Dunkel Draft (1991-92)
1. Dunkel 's Effort and Reactions
Taking advantage of the US government's concessions in
the agricultural field, GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel
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presented his final compromise proposal to the negotiators
in December 1991. This proposal seemed to split the
differences between the US and the EC positions. It called
for a 36 percent reduction in budgetary expenditures for
export subsidies combined with a 24 percent reduction in the
subsidized export volume. It proposed domestic support cuts
of 2 0 percent from the average of support in the period
1986-1988, with the reductions phased in over the 1993-1999.
It recommended tariff ication of all import barriers, with
tariffs to be reduced by 36 percent in the 1993-1999 period
and the reduction for any single product to be not less than
15 percent.
On December 19, however, France condemned the result of
the Uruguay Round trade talks. Prime Minister Edith Cresson
told a Cabinet meeting that France would oppose the Dunkel
draft, (i) A meeting of EC trade and agriculture ministers
was convened on 23 December. That meeting found the Draft
Final Act to be unbalanced, particularly with respect to
agriculture, and defined it as a reference document for the
final phase of the negotiations. (2) US reaction was swift
but less negative. The President of the American Farm Bureau
(1) William Dullforce, "Paris quick to oppose Gatt
conclusions," Financial Times December 19, 1991: 4.
(2) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Activities
1992 (Geneva: GATT, 1993) 15.
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Federation (AFBF) said that US farmers could not accept a
deal on farm trade reform on the terms offered by the EC.
He continued that there had to be locked- in cuts in
tonnages of subsidized farm produce on world markets. He
also stated that the Federation would agree to the lifting
of the section 22 in the US law, which protects sugar,
peanuts, dairy and cotton farmers against imports only in
the context of a multilateral agreement on agriculture in
which US farmers received as much as they gave. (3) The
AFBF's position on Dunkel's proposal, however, was not
direct opposition to it but that the Federation would
continue to work for its improvements. (4) Most of the US
agricultural lobbies were pleased with most of the Dunkel
draft, but protected commodity groups -peanuts
,
dairy, suga
and cotton- opposed the final package. (5)
In facing the deadlock in the trade negotiations
despite US concessions in agriculture. President Bush took
tough trade stance against the EC by reiterating US
government intention to provide US farmers with EEP
(3) William Dullforce, David Gardner, "Last chance for
Uruguay Round," Financial Times December 4, 1991: 7.
(4) Committee on Ways and Means House of Representative,
Draft Final Text of the Results of the Urucruav Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Washington: US government
Printing Office, 1992) 113.
(5) Nancy Dunne, "Congress could agree on Round this year.
Financial Times January 29, 1992: 3.
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subsidies to offset an avalanche of subsidized exports by
the EC. (6) He said the US would not halt the EEP program
until the EC had cut its own export subsidies
.
(7) It was
also noted by GATT that the US has taken a measured approach
to use its unilateral powers under the section 301 of the
1988 Trade Act and similar procedures. Officials in GATT
complained that although no retaliatory measures against
unfair traders have been taken in the past several years the
US was still using threats of unilateral action. (s) It was
said that the US was considering regional trade deal,
conclusion of bilateral agreements, imposition of anti-
dumping and countervailing duties and use of Section 301 of
Trade Act to push for its economic programs if the Uruguay
Round trade negotiations failed. (9)
On January 16, France officially rejected the Dunkel
plan for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round trade talks,
which it described as unfair to French interests and
unacceptable. Even the French foreign trade minister
(6) William Dullforce, David Gardner, "EC and US run into
crisis on farm trade talks," Financial Times November 22,
1991: 1 and 7.
(7) Kevin Brown, Lionel Barber, "Bush puts blame on Japan
and EC for traded row," Financial Times January 3, 1992:
10.
(8) Frances Williams, "Gatt warns on US retreat from
multilateralism," Financial Times March 13, 1992: 3.
(9) "Free trade's fading champion," The Economist April 11,
1992: 66.
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accused the US of blackmail and said that there was no
reason to conclude a rapid agreement simply to accommodate
the US elections
. do)
The EC was split into two main camps. France, Denmark,
the Netherlands and Belgium wanted to renegotiate the GATT
prescription. The others emphasized instead that
compensation to farmers for subsidy cuts under both the
Round and EC farm reform should be included in the green box
for subsidies which do not distort production and trade. (ii)
Under these circumstances, German Chancellor Kohl met
President Bush in March. Kohl said that although there had
been constructive conversation in the meeting, he had flatly
refused calls for Germany to put pressure on France to
compromise in the fight over how far to cut the subsidies
and quantities of EC farm exports. As a result,
negotiations between the US and the EC ground to a halt and
the March 31 deadline was missed. Speculation began to
spread that if the Round was not completed by late spring,
the negotiations were likely to go into limbo until after
the US presidential election in November . {12) Bush's
(10) Victor Mallet, "France accuses US of blackmail over
Gatt deal," Financial Times February 18, 1992: 8.
(11) David Gardner, "EC ministers renew bid for common Gatt
stance," Financial Times March 3, 1992: 8.
(12) Frances Williams, " Uruguay Round talks halted in their
tracks," Financial Times March 27, 1992: 6.
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meeting with Mr. Jacques Delors, president of the EC,
April also turned out to be a failure.
2. An Explanation of Its Reiection by Both Sides
There were five issues on which the two sides were
divided. First, while there was apparent agreement on a 35
percent cut in export subsidies and a 30 percent cut in
other forms of support, no agreement has been reached on the
base line from which those cuts were to be measured, with
the EC suggesting 1986-90 and the US still insisting on
1986-88. Second, the US wanted the cut in export subsidies
to be backed up by a limit on export tonnages, while the EC
suggested a mixture of volume restraint and cuts in
financial support, an approach in which the US has limited
confidence. Third, the EC wanted to be able to balance its
reductions in support with increases in protection against
the cereal substitutes that enter duty free. Fourth, the EC
wanted its compensatory payments for price reductions to be
in the "green box" of permitted non-trade distorting
subsidies, while US deficiency payments should be in the
"amber box" of trade-distorting subsidies that were to fall
within the limits set upon assistance. The US argued that
both sorts of assistance should be in the same box. Fifth,
the US wanted the EC to commit itself to further reductions
in support after the initially agreed changes have been
implemented. But the EC was prepared only to accept a
commitment to a review. (13)
One of the conspicuous factors of the deadlock during
this period was the narrow win- set of France. Although it
was not clear whether the French government intentionally
took an uncompromising stance on farm issues, its win- set
was restrained by the gloomy prospect for Socialist victory
in the elections which would be held early 1993. But the
fundamental reason for the continuous failure of the talks
was the opposition by lobby groups from the US and the EC.
Their stubbornness narrowed the win- set of both sides and
made it impossible for both win- sets to overlap.
B. Impact of the Oilseeds Dispute (1992)
In mid-1992, a conflict over oilseeds subsidies became
acute. It was reported that the Bush Administration was
debating a list of $1 billion in sanctions in retaliation
for the EC's oilseeds regime which the US claimed had cost
it several billion dollars in soybean sales. The oilseeds
dispute first arose in 1987, when the US complained that EC
subsidies contrary to the rules of GATT cut into benefits
the EC had granted in 1962 when it agreed to allow oilseeds
(13) Editorial, "Impasse on farm trade," Financial Times
November 22, 1991: 18.
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in duty-free. An independent GATT dispute panel had twice
declared the subsidies unjustified. The EC insisted that US
exporters had lost ground to third world exporters rather
than because of the subsidy regime. So, it refused to
dismantle the regime, instead offering to compensate the US
and other oilseed exporters
.
(14)
Both sides then moved toward confrontation. In the US,
the Administration was being pressed by farm organizations
and the Congress to make that dispute a test of
effectiveness of the GATT by a strong demonstration of
discontent
.
(15) One prominent participant on the US side
was the American Soybean Association, whose long-delayed
case against the EC oilseeds subsidies- twice won in a GATT
dispute settlement panel- might well be enmeshed in a final
GATT farm deal. In the hope of avoiding that linkage, the
group has been urging the administration to impose $1
billion in sanctions against the EC since August when a 60-
day negotiation period under GATT expired. Sixty US
senators signed a letter to the administration urging the
US to take action to enforce its GATT right. (16) In Europe,
(14) David Dodwell, "EC makes new offer in oilseeds
dispute." Financial Times August 6, 1992: 5.
(15) Nancy Dunne, "Bush under pressure in oilseeds row,"
Financial Times August 18, 1992: 3.
(16) Nancy Dunne, "Americans know they have much to lose,"
Financial Times October 9, 1992: 4.
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France had threatened to boycott the emergency EC summit if
the EC made concessions to the US on subsidized farm
trades. (17) The EC also had threatened to counter-retaliate
against the US if the US went ahead with trade reprisals
over EC oilseed subsidies.
However, the EC showed some willingness to negotiate
compensation terms with US. (is) Yet the compensation offers
did not address US demands for EC production cuts. The EC
was unwilling to cut oilseed output below 9.5m tonnes, while
US farm lobbies wanted a 7m tonne ceiling. EC officials
said reform of the CAP agreed in May would ensure cuts in
oilseed production to 9.5m tonnes. They warned US
negotiators that deeper cuts would require the CAP reform
package be opened up, raising the risk that EC member states
opposing the reforms would unravel other parts of the
package
.
(19)
There were political issues for the French too. The
Socialist government faced defeat in 1993 elections. Under
pressure from its farmers, it was retreating from its
commitments under May's reform of the CAP. (20) As a result,
(17) Lionel Barber, David Dodwell and David Gardner, "French
threaten summit boycott in trade row, " Financial Times
October 12, 1992: 1.
(18) Francis Williams, "EC threatens to counter-retaliate in
subsidy dispute," Financial Times June 19, 1992: 3.
(19) David Dodwell, "US and EC pursue deal on oilseeds,"
Financial Times October 21, 1992: 7.
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the US relented and offered to accept the ceiling implicit
in the Community's reformed CAP of 9.5m tonnes. But it
wanted binding guarantees
.
(21) The administration's offer,
however, has failed to gain the support of the American
Soybean Association. Thus in spite of US moderation, no
solution was found on oilseeds dispute.
After the collapse of talks in Chicago in November
1992, the US announced it would slap 200 percent tariffs on
European white wine exports and other farm products if
dispute were not settled in 30 days. (22) The French farm
minister urged the EC to counter-retaliate against US
sanctions in the oilseeds disputes and congratulated himself
and his predecessors on standing firm against the very bad
GATT deal offered by the US. (23) However, French demands
for retaliation were fended off during an informal two day
meeting of EC trade ministers with German and British
ministers calling for a quick return to the negotiating
table
.
(20) David Gardner, "Gatt hopes sink into electoral morass,"
Financial Times October 23, 1992: 6.
(21) David Gardner, Nancy Dunne, "US and EC in last-ditch
trade talks," Financial Times October 31, 1992: 2.
(22) Nancy Dunne, Ivor Owen and David Gardner, "Trade row
erupts in Brussels as US sets out sanctions," Financial
Times November 6, 1992: 1.
(23) David Buchan, French urge EC to fight bad deal,"
Financial Times November 5, 1992: 3.
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During this period there was no progress in the Uruguay
Round agricultural talks either. European perceptions of
domestic politics in the US prolonged the negotiations. The
Europeans were aware that the reason why US negotiators
could not be more flexible in their negotiating position was
strong influence of the lobby groups. Europeans were often
bemused by the power of these lobbies. It was reported that
a breakthrough over agriculture in the GATT Uruguay Round
was all but achieved when it was vetoed by the president of
the American Farm Bureau Federation. (24) EC officials were
also aware that President Bush badly wanted a deal because
of the Presidential election, and they were most likely to
get their best offer before November. (25)
The oilseeds dispute gave the EC negotiators the
impression that the US government could take unilateral
actions against European countries when the US government
thought them necessary. This situation also seemed to make
the EC think that the dispute would lead to continuous
conflicts with the US that would not be beneficial to the EC
and, as a result, the Uruguay Round might fail. This
perception by the EC toward the US government's measures
taken on the oilseeds dispute helped EC negotiators to think
(24) Nancy Dunne, "Farming lobby in US wields its power,"
Financial Times October 23, 1992: 6.
(25) Nancy Dunne, "Americans know they have much to lose,"
Financial Times October 9, 1992: 4.
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that at any case, confrontation should be avoided. However,
this situation did not bring about concessions from the EC
and could not enlarge the win-sets of France. The influence
of the domestic constituents in the EC and France was
stronger than pressures from the US to make concessions.
C. The Blair House Accord (1992)
1. The Accord and French Rejection
The farm policy reform by the EC gave a fresh impetus
to the Uruguay Round negotiations. On May 21 1992, the EC
agreed on the most radical overhaul of the CAP in its 30
year history. At the center of package was a 2 9 percent cut
in cereals prices over three years, which should lead to
cheaper feeds for livestock, enabling a 15 percent cut in
the beef price supports and a 5 percent cut in the butter
price. Sheep and beef were made subject to production
quotas. (26) The cuts were designed to move EC agriculture
towards world prices. Farmers were expected to be fully
compensated for them directly, but big farmers had to take
15 percent of their land out of production to get these
payments
.
(26) David Gardner, "EC farm policy on verge of wide-ranging
reform," Financial Times May 21, 1992: 1.
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The Cairns Group was cautiously optimistic that the
changes would inject fresh spirit into the talks. French
and German farmers, however, greeted the EC farm policy
reform with outrage. US trade representative implied that
there was still a gap between the new CAP changes to
internal EC market supports and continuing distorting
effects on international trade that are a central concern of
the Dunkel draft. The American Farm Bureau has also
responded bitterly to EC officials' suggestion that the US
should make further concessions in GATT. The Bureau
president said the EC reforms fell far short of the proposed
agricultural agreement put forward by Dunkel and further
short of what the Bureau would expect to achieve in the
talks . (27)
In spite of the development in agricultural trade
talks, the US and the EC remained stuck in apparently close
but irreconcilable positions on farm subsidies. US was
immovable on its central demand that the EC cut its volume
of subsidized food exports by 24 percent. The EC external
affairs commissioner was understood to have offered a 20
percent cut, with 5 percent swings within sectors, so that ,
for instance, in cereals, the EC could export more wheat if
it exported less barley. But the most the US appeared
(27) William Dawkins, Quentin Peel and Ivor Owen, "French,
Germ.an farmers denounce EC reforms," Financial Times May
23/24, 1992: 1 and 3.
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willing to accept was to extend the cuts over seven to eight
years. Another difference was an EC demand that the US
accept that compensation to be paid to fanners for cutting
output and setting land aside be defined as not distorting
to trade. The annual G-7 Economic Summit held in 1992 in
Munich could not narrow the difference and just adopted a
Communique agreeing that success in the Round was essential
for economic recovery in the industrial, former communist
and developing countries, but the leaders limited themselves
to an expectation that an agreement could be reached before
the end of 1992 . (28)
There were efforts to enlarge the win-set of France by
leading industrial exporters. For example, a US farm
economist in Europe published a report claiming that
successful completion of the Uruguay Round create an export
boom for French farmers in the high value processed products
that account for 70% of current farm products. It was
clearly intended to fuel the propaganda war between France
and leading industrial exporting countries. In response to
this report, Mr. Jim Rollo, a farm trade expert at the Royal
Institute for International Affairs in London said "Things
are not going to be as bad as the French say, but nor are
they going to be as good as the Americans say. France will
do well out of the realignment of EC agriculture and is
(28) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Activities
1992 17-18.
99
likely to gain a lot in Europe's internal market, perhaps at
the expense of German, British or Italian farmers. But
there is quite a lot of adjustment to go through ." {29) In
the meantime, France had pulled out every stop to get
Germany to back delay on GATT, arguing that the government
would fall and rioting by French famers would ensue if
agriculture subsidy cuts in the Uruguay Round were
agreed. (30)
On November 2 0 in Blair House, the US and the EC
settled their long-running disputes over subsidized food
exports, averting the threatened trade war. The Blair House
agreement on agriculture was more favorable to the EC.
Under it, EC oilseeds production would be restricted to the
5.128m hectares sown area contained in the EC's reform of
the CAP, instead of being subject to a formal tonnage limit
as has been previously discussed. The CAP implied taking 15
percent of land out of production, but the agreement reached
on May 2 0 obliged the EC to set aside only 10 percent of
oilseeds land. The overall volume of EC subsidized farm
exports would be cut by 21 percent, rather than the 24
percent prescribed in the Dunkel text. Direct payments to
(29) David Dodwell, "US fires new salvo in Gatt propaganda
war," Financial Times November 10, 1992: 4. The reporter
of this story in the Financial Times, however, does not show
specifically who wrote the study report.
(30) David Gardner, "Delors in Maastricht-Gatt trade-off,"
Financial Times November 12, 1992: 7.
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EC farmers in compensation for CAP price and production cuts
would be exempt from GATT cuts. The US also undertook to
monitor exports to the EC of its cheap cereals substitutes
in exchange for EC export restraint. This met the so-called
rebalancing demand, which had been made by both France and
Germany
.
(31)
The EC-US deal was expected to reactivate the
multilateral negotiating process in Geneva. Following a
meeting of the GATT Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) on 26
November, further negotiations were scheduled for market
access and initial commitments in services with the hope
that they would be pushed sufficiently far to permit a
meaningful but rapid negotiation on specific adjustments to
the draft Final Act to take place before the end of the
year
.
In fact, the new multilateral process received less
impetus from the Blair House agreement than expected. The
TNC meeting confirmed that agriculture was only one of the
many difficulties among participants and that all had to be
bridged in an inter-linked approach if a successful
conclusion of the Round was to be achieved. The situation
was particularly exacerbated when it became clear that
significant differences remained between the major players
(31) David Gardner, Nancy Dunne and David Buchan, "Trade war
averted as EC and US reach deal," Financial Times November
21/22, 1992: 1 and 2.
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on industrial tariff s-especially with respect to the zero-
for-zero process and some sensitive high-tariff products-and
in the services area. (32)
2. An Explanation of the Renection
As soon as the Blair House deal was announced, the
French Premier and Agriculture Minister both denounced the
pact as unacceptable. The French parliament also voted
against the US -EC compromise in farm subsidies and called on
the government to veto the agreement, if necessary. However
France's business chiefs warned that a veto of the agreement
would greatly damage French companies' interest. US oilseed
farmers also were bitterly disappointed as details of the
settlement trickled out. Farmers in France and other EC
nations continued protests against the farm pact from
November 25 through December 1. More than 50 French police
were injured in clashes with farmers in Paris. Farroers also
broke into the Paris stock exchange and briefly halted
trading. A rally in Strasbourg, France, home of the
European Parliament, drew 40,000 European farmers on
December 1. The French protests against the pact were an
expression of fear over the continuing decline of
agriculture in France. (33)
(32) General Agreement on Tariffs Trade, GATT Activities
1992 18-19 .
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France had two options in relation to the US-EC farm
deal. If it accepted the agreement, the unpopular Socialist
government, desperately hoping to win back public approval
in the four months before general election in early 1993,
would almost certainly face stormy protests from the farm
lobby. However, if France rejected the agreement, it would
not only risk triggering a trade war with the US but also
finding itself isolated within the increasingly fragmented
EC in the throes of this autumn's currency crisis and the
acrimonious debate over the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty.
Other participants regarded the French government
refusal to accept the US-EC farm trade accord as a rational
but high-risk game. The signs were that Paris was playing
for time so that it could find a way to calm down the
farmers and accept the deal without provoking too much
domestic unrest. They also saw that the Socialist
administration at the same time had to threaten to veto the
deal to guarantee its own survival . Part of the French
government's problem was analyzed as tactical. It had sold
CAP reform, with great difficulty, to its farmers as a
shield against further American demands in GATT. But, there
were genuine difficulties in gauging the CAP reform's impact
on future EC exports. Paris smelled a Brussels sell-out to
(33) Facts on File, T^^r.t.^ on F ^ l p Yp;^rhook 1992 889-890 and
918 .
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the US here, because, using different assumptions, France
forecasted that CAP reform would of itself result in a
smaller reduction in cereal shipments.
However, the real problem was pure politics. One
French official privately admitted the power of France's
farm lobby to be out of all proportion to its electoral or
economic importance. France's Im working farmers may
contribute 16 percent of the country's export, but they
account for only 6 percent of the electorate. Yet, much of
France's population was spread out across the country in
small towns and villages, making up the treasured rural area
whose well-being was dear to the French psyche. This rural
area, including all those whose livelihood depends
indirectly on farmers' incomes, makes up nearly 20 percent
of the electorate. The turnout rate among farmers at
elections was high too. Their political loyalties also were
very effectively divided. While about 80 percent of
country-dwellers voted for the political right, there was
particularly among small holders in the south a tradition of
supporting the radical and Communist parties. For a
Socialist party, which depended on Communist support to keep
it in power, this was very important.
In June 1992, the government came within three votes of
falling to a censure motion over CAP reform, because the
communists voted against the government. That was not an
experience the government wanted to repeat over GATT, where
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the communists could be counted on to vote against anything
they thought might be in the American interest. Precisely
for fear of being seen to do Washington's handiwork,
France's manufacturing sector and, even more, its service
sector-both of which could expect to do well out of an
overall GATT deal -barely raised their voice against the farm
lobby. (34) These situations in France could not lead to
enlargement of its win-set. What the French Socialist
government did was wait and see by playing for time until
the election.
Outside observers argued that France had three tactics
to get a best deal in the negotiation process. First,
France would continue to threaten directly or indirectly to
use its veto at all stages of the EC decision making
process. Second, by playing for time, it would be busy
calling its cards with potential allies within the EC. Key
to this effort was the backing by Germany. Third, France
could ask extra EC income support for its small southern
farmers in the process as a compensation for its acceptance
of the deal
.
The US and the EC really could have narrowed
differences in their win-sets motivated by US concession in
the process to the Blair House accord. However, French
politics and threat of use of veto by the French government
(34) David Buchan, "Agricultural superpower throws weight
into war," Financial Times November 6, 1992: 22.
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in the EC finally led to no overlap of their win-sets.
President Bush's willingness to strike a deal in the
Uruguay Round trade negotiations was regarded by the French
government as an opportunity to take advantage of the US
situation in their interests. So, it was not as willing to
reach an agreement as US negotiators were. This is because
they thought that the win- set of the US was getting larger
than before while their win-set was as narrow as before.
Although the result of the presidential election was
anybody's guess to the end of the race, most opinion polls
showed that President Bush was behind Governor Clinton in
popularity. So, it was widely expected that President Bush
would lose the election. The prospect of President Bush's
defeat in the election should have played a positive role in
breaking the deadlock by narrowing the difference of the
win-sets of both negotiating parties because the Clinton
administration would inherit no binding obligations from
president Bush's trade negotiators. In other words, it was
possible that President Clinton would impose his own trade
priorities on the long-delayed Round talks. He might also
direct the imposition of sanctions against the EC for its
refusal to reform its oilseeds subsidy regime so as to
eliminate damage to US farmers. (35)
(35) David Dodwell, "Trading system enters dangerous
waters," Financial Times November 5, 1992: 3.
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In the meantime, the fast -track mandate would expire on
by March 2, 1993. This factor could also have contributed
to the acceleration of the negotiations. However, it turned
out that this could not have much impact on negotiation
processes because French elections were just two weeks after
the expiration of the fast- track. In addition, the Clinton
administration had scarcely any time to decide what to do.
Later, President Clinton requested the extension of the
fast- track authority.
D. Adoption of the Final Text (1993)
1. From Deadlock to Agreement
In late 1992 and early 1993 the Uruguay Round ran into
two additional sets of difficulties. Before Christmas, the
legal text of an agreement on new trading rules was opened
up to a flurry of amendments on issues ranging from
intellectual property to textiles. Then, in January, the
negotiations between the US and the EC over what tariffs to
cut by how much reached an impasse. The US wanted to
eliminate tariffs on items such as electronic and non-
ferrous metal. The EC insisted that the US make cuts in
sensitive areas such as textiles.
The Blair House accord itself was partly to blame for
all this. Having given away so much to the EC on farm
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trade, the US felt that it had to make up ground where it
could. On the eve of leaving office, the Bush
administration stressed that only a maximum package would
win Congress's approval. Likewise, the Clinton
administration has given little away by criticizing the farm
deal for being too soft on Europe. For its part, however,
the EC felt that it made concessions, even at the risk of
isolating France, which was against the deal. The EC wanted
the US to recognize this by moderating its demands. (36) In
the meantime, the EC's External trade Commissioner urged the
Clinton administration to seek extension of the fast-track.
In April, it was reported that the US government would ask
the congress to grant the extension of the fast -track and in
May, President Clinton won the extension of the fast-track
authority
.
The March 1993 French election yielded a new majority
in the National Assembly. President Mitterrand named
Edouard Balladur premier of France following a general
election landslide victory for the nation's traditional
conservative parties. His appointment meant that France's
government would again represent a "cohabitation" between a
conservative premier and a socialist President.
In May, the new French government unveiled its
positions on the stalemated Uruguay Round talks. It
(36) "The Uruguay round... and round," The Economist January
23, 1993: 68.
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rejected a trans-Atlantic agreement on farm subsidies
reached in November, rebuked the US for reprisals and argued
that liberalism in world trade was not sufficient in itself
at a time when many European jobs were threatened. The
statement appeared to be addressed principally to the US
government. It defended some European subsidies and revived
a French belief that the cultural heritage of Europe needed
to be defended. In relation to agriculture, France rejected
particularly a clause saying that EC grain exports should be
cut 21 percent over the next six years. (37)
In June, however, France accepted the EC-US oilseeds
pact when the EC agreed to increase compensation to French
farmers. In July when the Tokyo G-7 Summit meeting began, a
lot of countries expected a compromise on all the difficult
fields of Uruguay Round trade talks. When it came to
agriculture, however, the Summit gave nothing more than a
worthy promise. (38)
In August, the French government tried to persuade
members of the EC to give France some sort of compromise so
that the French government could placate farmers and sign
the deal . The French effort was focused on German
Chancellor Kohl. As a result, Mr. Kohl surprised
(37) Roger Cohen, "French disavow accord on farm-trade
subsidy," The New York Times May 14, 1993: D2
.
(38) "Playing to the balconies," The Economist July 10,
1993: 57.
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negotiators from other countries when he said that Germany
shared some French concerns about the Blair House accord
after meeting with French prime minister. (39)
In September, French farmers once again went to the
streets to oppose the Blair House agreement. Members of
France's wildcat farm union succeeded in sporadically
blocking some roads and rail lines around Paris.
Nevertheless, there was split of opinion within the EC about
the farm issue. The French continued to raise its four
main complaints about the Blair House accord. First, the 21
percent cut in the volume of subsidized exports for each
crop over six years was too severe. France wanted to spread
the cuts over a longer period, to prevent cuts being largest
during the first year, and to aggregate the cuts over many
crops, thus letting France choose where the cuts should
fall. Second, the European Commission breached its mandate
by exceeding the reform of the CAP. The entire Blair House
accord should be scaled back. Third, the accord contained a
peace clause, preventing one side from making further
complaints about the farm trading practices of the other.
But, this lasted for only six years; France wanted to be
left in peace for longer. Fourth, in the light of the
summer's turmoil in the European currency markets, there
should be protection against fluctuating exchange rates,
(39) Facts on File, F^^cts on File Yearbook 1993 654.
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which might make it harder to live up to the accord. (40)
The British agriculture minister said that the UK would
strongly object to any backtracking on the Blair House
agreement
.
(41) The position of France had whole-hearted
supports from Spain and Ireland, but only partial support
from Germany.
In October, because there was no progress in the
agricultural trade talks, France floated the idea that GATT
negotiators should aim to reach an interim trade accord in
1993, leaving difficult issues such as agriculture and
audiovisual broadcasting to be resolved later. The French
call for a partial GATT was, however, regarded as a switch
of tactics for Paris, which has been insisting on a global
deal with other countries making concessions in the 14 non-
farm areas to balance out any sacrifices made by France in
agriculture. The tactical change seemed designed to avoid
France being accused of obstructing all progress with its
demands for a revision of the 1992 trans-Atlantic farm
deal. (42) The French government also seemed to try to take
advantage of anti-American mood rising among its people.
(40) "The Uruguay Round: French dread," The Economist
September 18, 1993: 78.
(41) Andrew Hill, David Buchan and Deborah Hargreaves,
"French warn of crisis over farm accord, " Financial Times
September 16, 1993: 6.
(42) David Buchan, David Dodwell and Nancy Dunne, "France
wants Gatt to leave farm issues," Financial Times October
12, 1993: 7.
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France felt the need not merely to stand up to the
Americans, but also to be seen to be doing so. Instead of
seeking to cover up its difference, as other friendly
nations were expected to do, France shouted about them from
the rooftops
.
(43)
Many participants in the negotiations, however, thought
that dropping agricultural issue out of the agenda of
negotiations was not possible because developing countries
who were being asked to open up their markets to developed
countries banks and insurance companies said that they would
only do so if the industrial North, in turn, opened its
markets to their farm products
.
(44
)
There was, however, some sign that France still had
interest in striking a deal on overall Uruguay Round trade
talks in spite of the differences in agriculture. The new
French prime minister began to widen domestic debate by
calling in representatives from all parts of political and
business life. For the first time, the public was hearing
about the advantages of trade liberalization. After nearly
a year of silence, the main employers' organization
has publicly urged the conclusion of a GATT deal by mid-
December. France's exporters of wine and spirits said that
(43) "France and America: The odd couple," The Economist
November 14, 1992: 57.
(44) David Dodwell, "Trade war: What it means to you,"
Financial Times November 7/8, 1992: 10.
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a failure to reach an agreement would be catastrophic for
them. (45) To get a best deal in other area of negotiations
than agriculture, the prime minister also sought to broaden
the French position, shifting the focus away from the sole
issue of agriculture to a more comprehensive list of
demands. He then embarked on intensive negotiations with
France's EC partners, trying to capitalize on any doubts
about GATT they might have. In addition, he has sought to
assuage the nation's farmers by announcing that they would
receive fresh subsidies of 1.5 billion francs ($257
million)
.
(46)
The US government also tried to use different tactics
to persuade the EC and France. The Clinton Administration
threatened that if the EC did not show more flexibility in
the stalemated global trade negotiations, Washington would
move quickly to develop an alternative trading association
with Asia. Some US government officials said that they were
treating the Pacific rim economic summit meeting in Seattle
in November as an opportunity to lay the groundwork for a
possible trading association, if the stalled negotiations
with Europe over the GATT were not completed. Explaining
this tactic, the Administration official said that the
(45) "Reculer pour mieux faire le commerce?" The Economist
October 23, 1993: 56.
(46) Peter Gumber, "France is getting what it wants by
taking hard line on Gatt, " Wall Street Journal December 8,
1993: A2.
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French in particular would never make the necessary
concessions unless they believed they were the only ones
standing in the way of a successful GATT agreement. Passage
of the North American pact and a successful Asia-Pacific
meeting would enhance those prospects and put additional
pressure on the French. (47)
The expected cost of failure in the Uruguay Round began
to be emphasized and this also played a role in making
participants in the trade talks continue to try enlarging
each other's win- sets. It was expected that if the world
forsook the Uruguay Round, it would lose significant
benefits. Estimates by the World Bank and the OECD
suggested that these additional reforms could eventually be
worth some $213 billion- $274 billion each year to the world
economy. These would be just the most visible opportunity
costs of a Uruguay Round failure. The eventual costs could
be much higher still. Even with the big powers on their
best behavior, a failure of the Uruguay Round would have
repercussions for the world trading system. At best, the
result might be a gradual corrosion of the open- trading
mechanism. But, if the big trading powers were to begin
playing tough, the descent into protectionism could be much
faster. Ultimately, therefore, the value placed on a
(47) Thomas Frieman, "US threatens to look eastward for
trade allies," The New York Times November 16, 1993: A16.
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successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round depended as much
on the uncertain and speculative costs of a collapse as it
did on the more readily quantifiable gains from success. (48)
A dim prospect of getting another extension of the fast-
track also played a positive role in narrowing the
differences in win-sets of the US and the EC. President
Clinton's authority to negotiate a global trade deal
effectively was going to expire on December 15. So, if an
agreement could not be reached by then, the Administration
would have to win Congressional approval of an extension,
which could be difficult in light of the fight over the
North American Free Trade Agreement
.
Finally on December 7, the US and the EC reached
agreement in agriculture with US concession. It included
(48) "The eleventh hour," The Economist December 4, 1993:
23-24. It is mostly private observers such as editors of
newspapers and major economic groups who began talking about
the dangers of the Round collapse. However, there was an
indirect implication by the negotiators about the danger of
failure of the Round. The two powers, the US and the EC,
have insisted that an unsatisfactory deal would be rejected,
even if that meant no deal at all. Such statements actually
contained an element of bluff: yet there was still a stark
inconsistency in official attitudes. At the same time as
governments publicly professed their readiness to
countenance failure, they insisted with equal conviction
that no issue had more far-reaching implications for the
future prospects of the world economy than the successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round. This means that even
though it is unclear where the idea of the possible loss
from the failure of the trade talks originated from, it
seems that the negotiators aimed not only at getting
concessions from their counterparts but also at persuading
the people, particularly lobby groups, whom they represent,
to accept the possible deal.
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exempting the EC's grain stocks from the reforms and basing
Uruguay Round cuts in farm subsidies on 1991 and 1992,
rather than 1986-89 when output was lower. In return for US
concessions in agriculture, US trade representative said
that the EC has agreed to scrap tariffs worth $5 billion to
American exporters in a number of politically sensitive
areas, including wood and paper products, most non-ferrous
metals and some electronics
. (49) Having got what it wanted
from the US, France has turned on other EC countries. It
wanted promises of compensation if French farmers
suffered. (50) At EC summit on December 10th, Europe's
leaders agreed to compensate France's farmers if, because of
GATT, they should have to take more land out of production
than envisaged under the 1992 reform of Europe's CAP. (51)
2 . An Explanation of How Agreement Was Possible
Domestic politics in both the US and France prolonged
the Uruguay Round negotiations. As is the case with most
new administrations, the Clinton Administration's
negotiating team was slow to take positions on various
(49) "The Uruguay round: The very, very end," The Economist
December 11, 1993: 75.
(50) "The Uruguay round: The very, very end" 76.
(51) "EU and GATT: Drinks all round," The Economist
December 18, 1993: 49.
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issues in the Round. Agriculture was one of the unresolved
areas to the new negotiating team too. As Mr. Kantor, new
trade representative of the US mentioned, the US government
felt that Bush administration had made too many concessions
in agriculture. So they believed the negotiation would not
be progressive without the EC making some concessions in
other areas. This intention of the US government was often
shown in the negotiation process. It was also clear that
some segments of the administration were more sympathetic
with industrial protection and openly talked about having
more managed trade and an industrial policy. In addition,
there were efforts by the administration to find areas where
the US could get concessions. They found the trade
liberalization of audio-vidual services, chiefly film and
television programs to be one of the areas. The EC
protected its film and television industry by manipulating
both output with quotas on local content and input with
subsidies. In France, the grand total of subsidy to the
film and television industry was FFr2.1 billion. (52)
However, negotiations hit a stumbling block in the form of
French demands that audio-vidual services be exempted from
the Round. Protesting that liberalization would sweep away
Europe's last defenses against a flood tide of American
(52) "Culture and trade: Cola v Zola," The Economist
October 16, 1993: 78.
mass-market entertainment, France argued that culture was
too important to be abandoned to the free market. (53)
The intention of the new US trading team of raising the
audio-vidual issue, for the first time during the Uruguay
Round, seemed clear: to use the concessions in the
agriculture as a bargaining chip for the US to get
concessions in this area. The US film exports were the
nation's second largest after aerospace with sales in Europe
alone of $3.7 billion in 1992. So, Mr. Kantor maintained US
government's firm stance on this issue by saying that " No
Uruguay Round of trade talks will be finalized unless this
issue is resolved ."( 54
)
French positions were frozen up until and even after
spring 1993 election. The new cabinet in France was also
against the farm deal reached between the US and the EC.
This was because the conservatives could do well in the
election under the same campaign promise as the Socialist
government did: opposition .to the Blair House accord. Both
sides also recognized that the agriculture was not the only
obstacle blocking the successful conclusion of the Uruguay
Round. Negotiators were also at odds with each other on
tariff reduction, textiles, services, particularly opening
(53) Editorial, "Cultural imperialism," Financial Times
October 6, 1993: 12.
(54) Roger Cohen, "Culture dispute with Paris now snags
world trade," The New Ynrk Times December 7, 1993: D2
.
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of markets to film, and electronics. These failures have
begun to overshadow the entire Round. So, during this
period, those factors helped restrict the overlap in US and
EC win-set.
Nevertheless, signs of hope emerged due to several
factors. First of all, it was undeniable that most of the
participating countries wanted the Round to be successful
because of the benefits it would bring. During the last
seven years, this factor has been moving force in the
negotiations when participants faced numerous failures in
the agricultural trade talks. In addition, the expected
cost of failure in the Round began to be mentioned.
This situation pushed negotiators into further efforts to
find solutions to their different positions. Second, the US
government tried to show the EC that it was eager to shift
its attention from European countries to Asian countries if
the stalled negotiations with Europe over GATT were not
completed. The US government's threat of use of unilateral
action also moved the negotiations forward. Third, new
French government also showed some sign of trying to find
exit to the stalemate. As a gesture of it, the French
government asked face saving compensation to its farmers and
the EC, whose members had been eager to reach a agreement in
the Round, gave France what it wanted. The French
government also gave its farmers extra money to soften the
blow. These factors propelled the negotiating process
and
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contributed to the enlargement of win- sets of the US and the
EC.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Robert Putnam's two-level analysis of international
negotiations provides a way to explain why agricultural
issues threatened success of the Uruguay Round. Both the US
and France found it difficult to agree on agricultural
issues in the Uruguay Round because both faced strong
agricultural lobbies able to veto ratification of any
international agreement they did not like. The fact that
the farm issue in the Uruguay Round has become highly
politicized also made farm lobby groups take a tough
position
.
Although the 4.9 million working farmers in the US made
up only 2 percent of the population, they continued to hold
power and influence in Congress and in the White House.
Thus neither the Democratic nor the Republican party has
dared challenge the basic premise that the government had a
responsibility to support farmers. At stake were the
hearts, minds and votes of a pivotal special interest group
spread throughout the nation's breadbasket. Farmers
occupied important political and financial positions in
nearly every state and in a large percentage of
congressional districts, where they were usually well-
organized and well -versed in making their feelings and
opinions known to political office seekers. In addition,
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well-placed political contributions could buy access for
adroit Washington representatives. Direct financial backing
was distributed through political action committees funded
mostly by agribusiness, chemical and food companies, and
related manufacturers. Agricultural interests also spread
far beyond the farm, embracing a host of farm equipment,
seed, and fertilizer suppliers, truckers, traders, rural
bankers, and local shopkeepers, who together with farmers
made up slightly more than one-fifth of the nation's labor
force and produced goods and services totaling nearly one-
fifth of the US gross national product. While the
individual interests within the nation's huge food and fiber
system often has clashed, this economic universe began with,
and always revolved around, the farmers.
The farm lobby had considerable clout in France too.
Though farming occupies only about 5% of the labor force, it
is not 40 years since that figure was four times as high.
Farming remained an element not only of the French economy
but of the French soul. La France agricole was a reality
even to millions who formed no part of it, while to millions
still living in the towns and villages of the countryside,
the prosperity of its most visible industry was theirs.
These people also vote. Their turnout rate is also high.
If added by families and other closely associated voters,
the farm lobby arguably accounted for about one- fifth of all
votes cast. Nor were farmers insignificant in the economy.
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France was the world's second-biggest food exporter, only
next to the US
.
The success of French intransigence in the Uruguay-
Round rested on two features of the negotiation. First, the
Round involved negotiators from all over the world and dealt
with 40 issues besides agriculture. Success in the overall
trade talks required compromises in all areas of conflict,
including agriculture. Since there were 15 independent GATT
negotiating groups for different issues, it was not possible
for the interests of other sectors of the Round to influence
the negotiations in the agricultural sector.
That alone does not explain French success, however.
By itself, France was a significant but not a major
negotiator. As part of the EC it could be a major
negotiator if it could control EC decision-making. It is
this second Level I game - the regional game within the
global game - that permitted France to gain such advantage.
The EC Council of Ministers' practice of unanimous decision
making allowed the most recalcitrant member government to
block decisions. So, the European Commission had to take
national positions into account before preparing any
agricultural trade policy proposal if it harbored any hope
of Council approval. The cost of no-agreement in
agriculture to the Level II constituents of France was so
low that EC negotiators had little flexibility in their
choice of alternatives in the negotiations either. Under
this context, the French government effectively threatened
to wield a veto power on EC decisions if it regarded the
matter as sufficiently important.
The expectation that the Socialist government in France
would not win the March 1993 National Assembly elections
froze the French government's positions on agricultural
reform issues and led to the stalemate of the negotiations
from early 1990 through 1993. The US concessions therefore
could not play a positive role in placating the French
government to accept the farm deal reached between the US
and the EC in November 1992. Instead, the French
negotiators tried to take advantage of the US negotiating
team's weakened positions caused by President Bush's loss in
the presidential election.
Thus the intransigence of French lobby groups and their
influence in French politics were major factors in stalemate
of the Round. With a narrow win- set and a low cost of no
agreement on its side, France could make use of others'
eagerness to gain agreement.
However, there were also other factors which
contributed to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay
Round. The fact that most of the participating countries
wanted the Round to be successful because of the benefits it
would bring led the negotiators to make more efforts to
compromise in the Round in the final stage of negotiations.
Reforms in the Uruguay Round were expected to be able to
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bring about more than $200 billion worth of benefits to the
world economy. France was no exception to these benefits
because as the world's fourth-biggest exporter, it was in
the French interests to agree on trade with less barriers.
It was also believed that the failure of the Round would
promote a surge in new trade frictions generated by-
increasing resort to unilateral trade actions and the
proliferation of discriminatory bilateral and regional
trading arrangements
. (i) By the same token, negotiators
could not ignore the expected cost of failure in the Round.
It was not difficult either to expect that consumers, other
sector companies than agriculture and unemployed would care
about the effects the farm support programs would have on
their income and employments. One found that more than 2
million jobs would be created in the EC if the Community's
farm policies were abolished. In the US, the budget deficit
could fall by almost $50 billion a year without support
policies. (2) One study done by two Australian economists
also found that the average cost of farm protection to
consumers and taxpayers amounted to about $1,400 a year for
(1) Jeffrey J. Schott, The Global Trade Negotiations: What
Can Be Achieved? (Washington D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1990) 8; Gilbert R. Winham, The
Evolution of International Trade Agreements (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1992) 103.
(2) "Agriculture survey," Thp Economist December 12,
1992:
8 .
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each non- farming household in 1990, and that it would amount
to $1,800 a year by 2000.(3)
The threat of blocking progress by the Cairns Group in
other negotiating panels if reform on agriculture was not
forthcoming was not without success. (4) Participating
parties in the negotiations from the US and the EC had to
consider the presence of the Cairns Group when they were in
negotiations. It is true that this situation was exploited
by the narrow win-set of the French negotiators in the first
stage of the Round. However, along with increased mentions
about the possible losses incurred to the world economy by
the failure of the Round, the Cairns Group's threat to
walkout of the whole Round if no reform agreement on
agricultural trade was forged was effective in the final
stage
.
The CAP reform was also a good sign for the Uruguay
Round. Differences in positions among member countries of
the EC could be narrowed in the CAP reform discussion. Side
payments given in the final stage of the negotiations by the
French government to its farmers as a compensation soothed a
little the angry responses of the farmers to the reduction
of the government support programs. In the same context.
(3) "Agriculture survey" 7.
(4) Richard A. Higgott and Andrew Fenton Cooper, "Middle
power leader and coalition building: Australia, the Cair
Group, and the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations," 628
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without concessions by the US such as exempting the EC's •
grain stocks from the reforms and basing subsidy cuts on
1991 and 1992 when the subsidy was lower and a pledge by
other members of the EC that the EC would compensate French
farmers losses which may be caused by the farm deal, success
of the Uruguay Round would have been hardly achieved. The
EC pledge was a side payment. Finally, the possibility of
refusal by US Congress to grant another extension of fast-
track negotiation authority to the administration also
pushed negotiators into making further efforts to come to
compromise their differences.
France got what it wanted in relation to agricultural
trade issues. It therefore comes as no surprise that the
final text on agricultural reform in the Uruguay Round is
very different from what the US first proposed but rather
similar to what the EC proposed. France also succeeded in
removing the film and broadcasting industry from the Uruguay
Round text. From the point of view of the US, however,
these issues could be regarded as negotiating leverages to
get more concessions in other areas. So, the Uruguay Round
did not turn out to be just a zero sum game only for France.
In return, the US could also secure steep tariff cuts in
products including wood, paper, fruits nuts and pork,
opening the way for greater American exports to Europe.
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
1985
November: GATT members agree to establish a preparatory-
committee to draw up an agenda for the new round, but
arguments persist over inclusion of service, agriculture and
the priority to be given to Third World interests.
1986
August: Fourteen food exporting countries set up Cairns
Group to represent their interests.
September: Uruguay Round launched in Punta del Este.
1987
January: Formal negotiations begin in 15 subject areas.
July: US tables a plan to scrap all farm subsidies with 10
years. EC reacts negatively.
1988
December: In Montreal mid- term review, agricultural discord
prevents agreements on intellectual property, safeguards and
textiles. Ministers agree a negotiating framework for
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services, lower trade barriers for tropical products,
improved disputes settlement.
1989
April: Framework agreement on agriculture is reached. It
called for substantial progressive reductions in
agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed
period of time.
October: US submits a comprehensive proposal where it
insists that three areas of internal support, market access,
and export subsidies should all be addressed.
December: EC submits a comprehensive proposal where it
maintains that an agreement needs only to specifically
address internal support
.
1990
July: Chairman of the Agricultural Negotiating Group, Mr.
Aart de Zeeuw, puts forward a proposal aimed at establishing
a common approach in the negotiating subjects.
July: Leaders of the seven biggest industrialized nations
pledge to complete the Round by the end of the
year. (Houston) This pledge is repeated in 1991 (London),
1992 (Munich) and 1993 (Tokyo), stretching G7 ' s credibility.
October: US submits a proposal based on the de Zeeuw paper.
November: EC submits a modest agricultural proposal.
Differences between the US and the EC proposals include the
scale of the reduction in internal support, export subsidies
and reference year for the calculation of the subsidy cuts.
December: Trade ministers from 107 countries fail to
conclude the Round. Discussions again founder over
agriculture
.
1991
May: Congress grants President Bush a two-year extension of
"fast- track" negotiating authority.
December: Arthur Dunkel, GATT Director General, puts forward
draft final act. France denounces the agricultural text and
the EC demands substantial improvement to the draft.
1992
May: EC members agree plan for radical reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy, reducing export subsidies and cutting
support prices.
May-November: US and EC go into a direct confrontation over
oilseeds dispute. Trade war between the US and the EC is
mentioned to be imminent.
November: US and EC agree terms for reducing exports of
subsidized farm goods. The "Blair House" accord paves the
way for resumption of the negotiations but is bitterly
contested by France.
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1993
January: President Clinton takes office after an
unsuccessful last-ditch attempt by the US and the EC to
patch up differences.
March: French election yields a new majority in the National
Assembly with the Conservatives taking over cabinet.
June: US Congress grants new "fast -track" negotiating
authority requiring President Clinton to notify by December
15 his intention to sign a Uruguay Round accord and
submission of the final deal to Congress by April 16 1994.
December: Countries formally agree to submit the final
Uruguay Round package to their governments for approval.
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